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not have the same value for financial or innovative performance in regulatory unstable environments.
Finally, the effect of investor experience is driven both by the social status and the knowledge resources
of investors. Moreover, both effects vary across institutional environment, but in different ways. Therefore,
it is necessary to consider the institutional environment to analyze which investors add value to a startup,
and the processes by which they do so.
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ABSTRACT

KNOW HOW, KNOW WHOM, KNOW WHERE: A GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF
INVESTOR EXPERIENCE AND STARTUP PERFORMANCE
Elisa Álvarez-Garrido
Mauro Guillén

This dissertation analyzes where and when experienced investors add value to
startups. Building on the resource-dependence theory and the relational view of the firm,
I argue that the positive effect of investor experience on startup performance is stronger
when the startup faces a more uncertain environment. The first essay predicts a greater
effect of investor experience early in the life cycle of the startup and when financial
markets are less developed; when the expropriation hazard is high, investors have fewer
incentives to make a contribution. The second essay examines the effect of investor
experience on different innovative outcomes, and how these effects vary with the hazard
of expropriation. The final essay studies whether these effects derive from the social
status or the knowledge of investors. I collected a sample of 688 biotechnology startups,
founded between 1990 and 2004, from 30 different countries, and followed them until
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they went public, were acquired, or until 2005. I gathered the patents and publications,
the investment history, and for each investor, the experience and network position in the
global syndication network. Empirical analyses address the endogeneity problem derived
from the matching of investors and startups using selection models and firm fixed effects.
The main finding is that the positive effect of investor experience on firm performance
and innovative outcomes is moderated by the institutional environment. The effect of
investor experience on the likelihood of an IPO or acquisition is accentuated when
financial markets are less developed; however, when faced with a hazard of
expropriation, the effect is attenuated. Interestingly, experienced investors enhance
innovative outcomes even more when the hazard of expropriation is high; this suggests
that the experience of investors does not have the same value for financial or innovative
performance in regulatory unstable environments. Finally, the effect of investor
experience is driven both by the social status and the knowledge resources of investors.
Moreover, both effects vary across institutional environment, but in different ways.
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the institutional environment to analyze which
investors add value to a startup, and the processes by which they do so.
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1. The Resource Provision Role of Investors
Introduction
Decades of research have examined the performance consequences of the
governance and ownership of the organizations, starting with the seminal work of Berle
and Means (1932) and continued by the work of agency theorists. More recently scholars
from different traditions have studied investors in their role of resource providers.
Resource-dependence theorists investigate the role of the board of directors in managing
environmental uncertainty and providing external resources (Daily & Dalton, 1994a,
1994b). Research on entrepreneurship has analyzed the performance consequences of
having different types of investors, and some of the mechanisms by which this may
happen (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sapienza, 1992). Besides,
the international business literature has studied how the investor mix changes across
countries, and their impact on performance (Berglof, 1988; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
& Shleifer, 1999).
Because investors provide resources to the organizations, it is important to
understand which investors have the more valuable resources and under what
circumstances investors may have a greater impact. This question is economically
important, especially for entrepreneurial firms, since they have to accept a lower
valuation of their business to attract investors with higher reputation, with the hope that
they will attain higher performance (Hsu, 2004). Past research has focused on answering
the first part of the question, finding for instance that investors with prominent affiliate
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networks have a greater effect on performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007;
Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Yet, there is still much to be learned about under what
conditions investors may have a greater impact on the performance of entrepreneurial
firms.
This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by analyzing where the effect of investors’
experience and networks impact the performance of entrepreneurial firms more, across
different institutional environments. In particular, I seek to understand (1) how the value
added by investors varies with the financial and regulatory environment; (2) how
investors contribute differently to different outcomes, such as financial performance and
innovative outcomes; (3) and the relevance of networks and knowledge of this effect
across different environments.

Literature Review
The Impact of Investor Mix on Performance
The link between investor mix and performance is one of the most important
topics in strategy research. It is well documented that investor mix varies widely across
firms, industries and countries (Berglof, 1988; La Porta et al., 1999). A subset of studies
has analyzed the impact of investors on performance, among which agency theory studies
are salient (e.g. Jensen & Ruback, 1983). This dissertation contributes to the strategy
literature by studying the impact of investor mix characteristics on the performance of
entrepreneurial ventures.
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Investors such as venture capital firms make their resources and abilities available
to their portfolio ventures, for instance by providing access to their network of contacts
(Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2002). As a venture capitalist explains, “we provide our portfolio
companies with access to our contacts in other countries. This is very useful, for example,
to help them internationalize. (…) [The portfolio firms] can use our contacts and offices
for the first contacts with the seller. They have support there: people who know the
country, the legal system… It is really useful for them.” 1
Consistent with the relational view of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998), the
resources and abilities that venture capital firms bring to the partnership relationship have
the potential to generate relational rents to the extent that they are complementary with
the venture’s resources. To effectively generate relational rents, firms within the alliance
need to develop an organizational complementarity such that the complementary
resources effectively generate rents (Dyer & Singh, 1998). De Clercq and Sapienza
(2001) theorize that it is through knowledge sharing routines and relation specific
investments that venture capital firms and entrepreneurs generate relational rents.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that successful venture capital firms learn how to
exploit this complementarity: “the type of consulting offered really depends upon the
skill sets that the individual VC brings to the table with respect to that specific deal”; “we
find ourselves spending a lot of time coaching in the areas they [the entrepreneurs] are
not strong in” (eBrandedBooks.com, 2000:153 & 211, respectively).

1

Interview with the Director of the Madrid’s office of a U.S. venture capital firm, Dec-20-2005, Madrid,
Spain.
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The mechanism by which investors’ resources impact the venture’s performance
is also consistent with the resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This
posits that when critical resources are controlled by a few organizations, firms that secure
the provision of such resources will be more effective and legitimate. To the extent that
there are critical resources in the hands of the best venture capital firms, ventures that
partner with them will attain a competitive advantage. This is precisely the rationale
behind the search for reputed and experienced investors: “the VCs provide capital and the
really good ones provide great strategic insight and a roll up their sleeves of attitude,” as
described by a venture capitalist (eBrandedBooks.com, 2000:232).
In sum, the relational view of the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998) and the resourcedependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) offer mutually consistent explanations as
to why investors’ resources impact the performance of new ventures. Hence, I propose:
Proposition 1.1: Investors’ complementary resources and capabilities are a
source of relational rents. Hence, ventures that partner with such investors enjoy
a competitive advantage.
The Heterogeneity of Venture Capital Firms
The link between investor mix and venture’s performance is an important topic in
the entrepreneurship literature. A subset of studies has analyzed the relevance of having a
venture capital firm in the syndicate for a venture’s performance, finding that venture
capital firms facilitate the formation of strategic alliances (Hsu, 2006; Lindsey, 2002),
and that they endorse ventures with their reputation (Hursti & Maula, 2007; Megginson
& Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999).

5
However, venture capital firms are not homogenous. On the contrary, they show
persistent differences in returns (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). A growing stream of literature
has studied the consequences for performance of some of these differences. Stuart et al
(1999) analyzed how the prominence of the different partners influenced the survival of
the firms, finding that ventures with prominent investment bankers were more likely to
go public. This effect of the reputation of venture capital firms is consistent with Hsu’s
(2006) findings that reputed venture capital firms facilitate the formation of
commercialization alliances more so than their less reputed counterparts. In a study of
U.S. venture capital investments, Hochberg et al (2007) found that venture capital firms
with a more central position in the syndication network increased the chances of survival
of their startup, even after controlling for the experience of the venture capital firm.
Besides the network position and connections of the investors, knowledge
resources are also invaluable. As a venture capitalist explains, “we want to be there for
the hiring process, because we’ve interviewed thousands of people, know good interview
techniques, and know how to get the right people” (eBrandedBooks.com, 2000:189).
Empirically, however, it is more difficult to separate the networks and knowhow effect,
since as the investor acquires experience and know-how, so she builds her network of
contacts. Yet, evidence supports the coexistence of both effects for U.S. investments
(Hochberg et al., 2007). In this dissertation I complement this earlier literature by testing
the coexistence of both effects in an international sample.
Besides, I will consider different measures of the experience of the investor.
Research has shown that there is an economically relevant difference in performance of
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investors in the top percentile compared to the average investor (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005).
This finding suggests that tenure and experience alone are not enough to achieve a
sustainable competitive advantage; on the contrary, only a few investors seem to build the
capabilities and resources that can grant above normal returns. This has implications on
how investors’ experience should be measured. In this dissertation I will propose that to
understand the value added it is necessary to consider the successful experience, and not
the bulk of experience, since this successes evidence learning. This is not to say there
cannot be learning from failure; rather, if there is learning, success should follow.
Proposition 2.1: Investors’ successful experience evidences valuable relational
resources, and as such, a source of competitive advantage for new ventures.
Proposition 2.2: The centrality and the brokerage position of the investor within
the syndication network are valuable relational resources and a source of
competitive advantage for new ventures.
This heterogeneity among venture capital firms poses an additional empirical
challenge: not only do venture capital firms differentially impact performance depending
on their characteristics, but the best venture capital firms are typically matched to the best
ventures. The literature has documented two simultaneous selection processes: venture
capital firms select ventures based on their quality (e.g. Baum & Silverman, 2004),
location (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001) or institutional environment (Guler & Guillen,
2010b); and ventures select venture capital firms based on their reputation (Hsu, 2004).
In my dissertation, I sought to separate the effects of selection from the value-added
processes.
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The Role of Investors in the Innovation Process
The ability of firms to innovate is one of the central topics in strategy, because it
impacts firm performance under certain appropriability conditions (Teece, 1986; Winter,
2000). Much research has analyzed the determinants of a firm’s innovative performance.
It has been suggested, for instance, that the locus of innovation resides in the
relationships of the firm, including investment partnerships (Powell, Koput, & SmithDoerr, 1996). I seek to contribute to this stream of research by analyzing how investor
mix impacts the innovative activities of young entrepreneurial ventures.
There is a common belief that venture capital investing is one of the main reasons
for the fruitful innovation in the last decades. In fact, the evidence seems to indicate so:
increases in venture capital activity in the U.S. during the 80s were associated with
significantly higher patenting rates, even after addressing causality concerns (Kortum &
Lerner, 2000). A plausible explanation could be the matching of the venture capitalists
with the most innovative ventures. In effect, innovator firms attract more venture capital
funding than imitator firms (Hellmann & Puri, 1998), maybe because patents signal
quality (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008).
An alternative, but complementary, explanation is that venture capital firms add
value to the innovative process of the firm. Indeed, venture capital backed firms market
their innovations faster than non venture capital backed firms (Hellmann & Puri, 1998).
The experience of venture capital firms may be valuable in managing the R&D process in
the specific firm, as suggested by the CEO of a biotech venture in an interview: “They
have a better sense as to what R&D projects will be easier to commercialize in the future,
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and they helped us focus.” 2 In sum, certain resources and abilities of venture capital firms
can foster the venture’s innovative process. Consistent with the relational view of the
firm and resource-dependence theory, ventures that partner with such venture capital
firms will be more successful in their innovation process. Hence, I propose:
Proposition 3.1: The knowledge of the technological landscape and the network
advantages of the investor are valuable resources in the venture’s R&D process.
Proposition 3.2: The more industry experience of the investment syndicate, the
greater the innovation output of the venture.
Venture Capital Investing Across Institutional Environments
Venture capital investing is today a global phenomenon (for details see: Deloitte,
2009). Recent research has studied the decision of the venture capitalists to enter a
particular country, as explained by the host country institutional environment and by the
investor’s network position (Guler & Guillen, 2010a, 2010b). Interestingly, once the
decision to enter is made, they invest in ventures with a similar risk profile (Guler &
McGahan, 2006). The globalization of this industry brings up new opportunities for
investors, but also for research, since it allows us to study how firms add value differently
in different institutional environments.
Previous research has explored the contingencies of the value added by investors
depending on the cycles of financial markets. Gulati and Higgins (2003) found that while
reputed investors generally reduce the information asymmetries to third parties by
endorsing a venture, this effect is greater when IPO markets are cold, since third parties
2

Interview with the CEO of a Spanish biotechnology firm, Dec-27-2005, Madrid, Spain.
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assume the investor has put more effort in the due diligence process. More generally one
would expect that in those situations with greater uncertainty, the effect of being
endorsed by a highly reputed investor are greater than in environments that are more
predictable. Similarly, the know-how that an investor may provide to a venture may be
more valuable when there is more uncertainty, since there is a greater performance gap to
be covered.
Proposition 4.1: The positive effect of investors’ networks and resources on the
performance of entrepreneurial ventures will be greater when the environment of
the venture is more uncertain.

Dissertation Outline
This dissertation consists of three essays which study how investors experience
and network position influence the performance and innovative outcomes of firms
differently across different institutional environments. Using an international sample of
biotechnology firms, I examine the variation across different environments of different
relationships: chapter 2 examines the effect of investor experience on entrepreneurial
firm performance; chapter 3 examines the effect of investor experience on the innovative
outcomes of entrepreneurial firms; finally, chapter 4 analyzes the extent to which the
effect of investor experience on both outcomes derives from the know-how or the
networks of the investor.
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Investors’ Experience and Venture’s Performance (Chapter 2)
Strategy scholars have shown the relevance of firm experience for performance,
not just as a learning mechanism (Argote, 1999) but also as the necessary path to
accumulate resources that may bring a competitive advantage to the firm (Dierickx &
Cool, 1989). Hence, it should not be surprising that firms benefit from the experience of
their investors. That said, attracting experienced partners comes at a price (Hsu, 2004),
and so it becomes relevant to understand when this experience of the investors more
impact on the performance of the entrepreneur.
Past research has focused on answering the question of how investors may add
value to the firm, or in other words, what they may bring to the venture in different
situations. Resource-dependence scholars have analyzed the impact of the board
composition on firm performance when firms are on the verge of bankruptcy, finding that
external directors and director interlocks allow the firm to access more external resources
and manage the environmental uncertainty better (Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b).
Entrepreneurship scholars have found that entrepreneurial firms benefit from having
prominent affiliates (Stuart et al., 1999), that investors use their human resource
management know-how to professionalize the top management teams and human
resource policies of startups (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), or that investors foster the
formation of commercialization alliances of startups (Hsu, 2006). Scant research has
focused, however, on the contingencies of these effects. Gulati and Higgins’ (2003)
study, which finds that the signaling effect of having a very reputed investors is
attenuated when financial markets are hot. Sapienza (1992) proposed several
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contingencies of when investors add more value, including some contextual variables
such as the stage of the venture and environmental uncertainty.
Chapter 2 analyzes how the effect of investors’ experience on firm performance
changes over the life cycle of the venture, and across institutional environments. I will
argue that when the entrepreneurial firm faces greater uncertainty from the environment,
the effect of investor experience is accentuated. Thus, I predict that the effect should be
greater earlier in the life cycle of the venture. I also expect a greater effect of investors’
experience when financial markets are less developed, because it is more difficult for the
venture to access external resources that may be critical for growth. Nonetheless, when
the environment uncertainty is such that the investors may not appropriate the returns to
their investment, they may have incentives to focus their attention and their human
resources on other firms in the portfolio; hence, I predict the effect of investors’
experience to be attenuated.
Empirically, the challenge lies in separating the effect of investors’ experience on
performance from the matching of investors and firms. It is well known that investors
select which firms they invest in, and that firms also choose their investors (Amit,
Brander, & Zott, 1998; Baum & Silverman, 2004; Hsu, 2004; Sørensen, 2007). The
empirical strategy will address these concerns by using a two-stage selection model.
While the interest of this dissertation is on entrepreneurial firm performance, it is
challenging to find comparable financial information for entrepreneurial firms. Instead, I
examine the occurrence of an initial public offering or an acquisition, both of which are
relevant milestones for investors and entrepreneurs, and have being used in the

12
entrepreneurship literature (e.g. Amit et al., 1998; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Stuart &
Sorenson, 2003). While most research studies have focused on the occurrence of an IPO
as the first best, previous research has shown that the occurrence of an acquisition is also
an important milestone, sometimes preferred (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007). In this chapter
I will consider both effects.
Investors’ Experience and Innovative Outcomes (Chapter 3)
There is a widespread belief that venture capital investments have spurred the
growth and innovative outcomes of the firms they invest in; and this belief has fostered
the growth of the venture capital industry across different countries. It is well known that
part of this association comes from a selection effect; unlike other investors, venture
capital firms have developed a distinctive ability to identify promising ventures in
dynamic environments (Amit et al., 1998). However, it is economically important to
know if there is an effect beyond selection. Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that even
after controlling for the selection effects, venture capital firms spurred innovative
outcomes in the United States.
There is still much to be learned about the mechanisms by which this may
happen. Chapter 3 seeks to fill this gap by analyzing whether there is an effect and by
proposing some mechanisms by which it may happen. I argue that in addition to selection
and providing access to capital, investors may spur the innovation processes by (1) by
increasing the general efficiency of the firm, freeing resources and attention that can be
focused on the innovative outcomes, and (2) by influencing the technological trajectory
of the firm, such that the innovative efforts are focused on applications with a higher
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application potential. In other words, the investors’ knowledge about how to manage
innovative ventures and about the landscape of innovations may have a positive effect on
the innovative outcomes of firms.
Just as the effect of experience on firm performance may vary across institutional
environments, the effect on innovation may vary as well. Zhao (2006) coins the term
“institutional arbitrage” to explain why some firms enter environments which are less
desirable when they provide a competitive advantage. In this chapter I will argue that
when the regulatory environment is less stable, and so the regulations applying to the
R&D processes may change, knowledge about the innovation landscape may be more
useful. Hence, I expect the effect of investor experience to be greater in these situations.
Empirically, I test the effect of the experience of investors on three different
innovative outcomes: patents, publications, and patent forward citations. While these are
measures of the output, and not about the process itself, they generally refer to an earlier
part of the innovation process. That is, they are better measures of inventions than they
are of innovations. As a result, these measures allow me to understand better the earlier
steps of the innovation process than that of the commercialization strategy, and provide a
stronger test of the effect of investors on the R&D process.
Jointly, these two essays allow us to understand how investors affect the
performance of entrepreneurial ventures, by analyzing differently the impact on a more
financial outcome (the occurrence of an IPO or an acquisition) and the impact on a
process outcome (innovation). Evidence that investors have an impact on the innovative
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outcomes of firms provides a process explanation for the impact on the more general
performance.
Investors’ Know-How or Investors’ “Know-Whom”? (Chapter 4)
The two first essays of the dissertation seek to answer the question of when
investor experience adds more value to entrepreneurial firms. The third essay
complements the previous two by analyzing two potential mechanisms by which the
experience of investors may add value, namely the knowhow and the “know whom” or
network resources, and how these two mechanisms vary across different institutional
environments.
There are two main explanations in past research of how investors may add value
to their portfolio firms. First, by endorsing entrepreneurial firms, investors reduce the
information asymmetries to third parties (Amit et al., 1998; Megginson & Weiss, 1991;
Stuart et al., 1999). There is, then, a certification effect, or a reputation transfer, which
changes the perception about the firm. Besides a reputation endorsement, the literature
has identified other effects that have a real impact on the processes of the entrepreneurial
firm, such as professionalizing the top management team (Hellmann & Puri, 2002) or
fostering commercial alliances (Hsu, 2006). I will call this second group the “value
added” explanations, which is not to say that a reputation transfer is not valuable. In fact,
it is difficult to separate the two processes empirically, because they are correlated by
definition (experienced investors are likely to have both the knowhow and the networks
of contacts). Nevertheless, there is a theoretical interest in understanding these processes
better.
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Using a sample of US investments, Hochberg et al (2007) found that both effects
coexist and are correlated. Even though more may be better, the prevalence of these
effects may change across different institutional environments. Chapter 4 contributes to
this stream of literature by analyzing the different effects of the investors’ network
position and experience across different institutional environments. This chapter builds
both theoretically and empirically on the previous two chapters to provide a better answer
to the overarching question of this dissertation: how and when investors add value to
entrepreneurial ventures.

Data and Method
The empirical setting for this dissertation is a sample of biotechnology
entrepreneurs that have obtained funding from venture capital firms, strategic partners,
government-sponsored institutions, or financial institutions. Focusing on the
biotechnology industry allows me to define a rather homogeneous measure of quality for
the entrepreneurs, based on patents and publications (Darby & Zucker, 2002; Graham,
Hall, Harhoff, & Mowery, 2002; Stuart et al., 1999), and to control for the standard
timing of funding, IPO, and/or acquisition. Although it would be appealing to study the
variation across different types of investors, they differ greatly in their degree of
involvement, the type of resources shared, and the time allocated to each investment. To
avoid this noise, I choose to focus on venture capital firms, building on a vast literature
that documents how they tend to share their expertise, resources, and networks with their
portfolio firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). To gain a better
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understanding of the processes underlying the motivations of venture capitalists, I
conducted informal interviews with venture capital firms and biotechnology firms.
Using VentureXpert (Thompson Financial) I collected all biotechnology firms
that received funding from any investor, including angels, venture capital firms, and
government-sponsored programs, and that were founded between 1990 and 2004.
Overall, the sample consists of 688 firms from as many as 30 different countries.
VentureXpert, the most comprehensive cross-national database of investments, collects
the full investment history for each firm, including funding by government-affiliated
institutions, financial institutions, strategic investors, or venture capital firms. The
database has been widely used in both the entrepreneurship (Megginson & Weiss, 1991;
Sahlman, 1990; Shane & Stuart, 2002) and the multinational literatures (Guler & Guillen,
2010a, 2010b; Guler & McGahan, 2006, 2007).
To measure the network position of the investments I need more information
about the whole set of investments, and not just investments in the firms in the sample.
Therefore, I gathered all the investment information from VentureXpert between 1987
and 2004, for investments in any industry and located in any country. With the help of
several research assistants, I cleaned the database to match investment and investor
information, and identified the venture capital firms in the network. Following previous
literature on dynamic networks, I defined an investment relationship (or tie) between two
firms if they had co-invested in the same round of investment in the past 3 years. Overall,
there are 116,453 investments between 1987 and 2004.
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Endogeneity is the more challenging empirical concern with this dissertation.
Investors select the firms they invest in, and firms also select their investors. Hence,
before concluding investors have an effect on the performance of entrepreneurial firms it
is necessary to understand the extent to which “good” investors are matched with well
performing firms. Chapters 2 and 3 follow two different empirical strategies, the details
of which are explained at length in the respective methodology sections. The advantage
of using different methodologies across the dissertation is that it provides some sort of
triangulation. Finding consistent results considering different dependent variables and
methodologies should increase the confidence in the presence of a value added effect of
investors beyond selection.
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2. Investors’ Experience and Firm Performance
Introduction
Ever since the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation,
the link between investors and firm performance has been a central topic in the business
literature, which has suggested that investors add value to the firm by providing access to
their resources and networks of contacts. The resource provision role of investors is
particularly relevant for entrepreneurial ventures. Fraught with change within the
organization and its external environment, ventures can obtain a competitive advantage
from having access to a broader array of resources that complements their growing asset
base. Both business scholars and practitioners have asked the questions of whether
investors can add value to startups, and which investors or which resources can create
more value. However, to add value investors not only should have valuable resources but
they have to make their resources available to the venture. Therefore, to unveil the
process by which investors may impact the performance of startups it is important to
understand the incentives to contribute their resources to the partnership.
From a resource-dependence perspective, investors may increase the performance
of the firms they invest in by providing access to their resources, hence increasing the
firms’ effective resource bases for adapting to the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Much of the empirical work in this tradition has analyzed the performance
consequences of outside directors and interlocks, arguing that these provide access to a
broader array of resources and information that may confer an advantage to the firm in
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situations of higher uncertainty (Boyd, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994a; Pfeffer, 1972).
Entrepreneurial ventures, in particular, can leverage the expertise of the investors on the
board to compensate for their own management’s lack of expertise of, thus improving
performance (Kor & Misangyi, 2008; Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). Entrepreneurship
scholars have also addressed the question of how investors in general, and venture capital
firms in particular, may add value to startup performance and the processes by which this
happens, including reputation endorsements (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al.,
1999) and the leverage of network resources (Hochberg et al., 2007; Hsu, 2006).
However, just as firms collaborate to generate synergies from their strategic
alliances (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), investors have to make their resources
available to add value to the startup; and to do this, investors should have the right
incentives. This chapter seeks to explore how investors’ incentives to share resources
with their ventures moderate the performance consequences of investors’ expertise. I
argue that experienced investors have accumulated the resources that may enhance the
performance of entrepreneurial ventures. However, the effect of these valuable resources
on venture performance is moderated by the extent to which investors have incentives to
share those resources. I hypothesize that the performance effect of investors’ expertise
should be greater in the early stages of a firm’s development, when the financial
environment is less developed, and when the hazard of appropriation of the return is
greater.
I test these arguments with a global sample of 688 biotechnology ventures
founded between 1990 and 2003. A focus on venture capital firms is not new to the
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management literature (Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008; Fischer &
Pollock, 2004; Fitza, Matusik, & Mosakowski, 2009; Guler & Guillen, 2010a); these
firms are one of the major investors in entrepreneurial ventures, and they collaborate with
the top management in shaping the strategic decision making to increase a startup’s
chances of success. However, the extent to which they do so varies across firms and
institutional environment (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2008; Guler & McGahan,
2006), and so it is appropriate to use a global study.
Measuring the performance of startups presents many problems. Most research
focuses on the occurrence of an initial public offering (IPO) (Darby & Zucker, 2002;
Kroll et al., 2007; Stuart et al., 1999), since it is generally accepted that only goodperforming firms are taken public and that investors generally prefer this option (Jeng &
Wells, 2000). Though less commonly examined in the literature, acquisitions are also
related to a venture’s performance and are used as an alternative to an IPO under certain
macroeconomic conditions, or even as the final objective for investors (Ragozzino &
Reuer, 2007). Hence, while the main interest of the chapter is on entrepreneurial firm
performance, I develop hypotheses in terms of the likelihood of occurrence of either an
IPO or an acquisition.

Investors’ Resources
Resource-dependence theory has long studied the link between the resource
provision role of investors and firm performance. This theory posits that when
organizations lack the necessary resources to adapt to changes in the environment, they
depend more on external resources and face greater uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik,
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1978). Empirical tests have focused on how firms manage environmental uncertainty by
adapting the composition of the board of directors. Firms that face more uncertainty tend
to have boards with a higher number of interlocks, which suggests that directors with
more connections to other firms have access to a greater pool of external resources that
are valuable for the firm on the verge of change (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972). A subset of
this literature is concerned with how low-performing firms use the board of directors to
avoid bankruptcy. In a matched sample design, Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b) found
that bankrupt firms tend to have a lower proportion and a lower number of independent
directors.
More recent empirical work on resource-dependence theory has shifted the
attention to how entrepreneurial ventures depend on the external environment to obtain
the resources they lack internally in order to overcome their liability of newness. For
instance, young ventures supplement their top management’s industry experience by
appointing experienced outside directors (Kor & Misangyi, 2008); furthermore, when
these outside directors provide advice and counsel to top management, rather than simply
monitoring their actions, young public firms experience higher performance (Kroll et al.,
2007).
The problem of how investors contribute to a venture’s performance, however, is
not new. The entrepreneurial finance literature has long studied how startups benefit from
the partnership with investors such as venture capital firms, which have a high stake in
the firm and whose business model involves collaborating with the firm to improve
performance (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Overall, there is
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general agreement that firms backed by a venture capital firm perform better. Reputation
endorsements are one of the mechanisms by which investors add value to the firm, since
the venture needs time to build a reputation by itself (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart
et al., 1999). Investors also add value by professionalizing the firm’s management team
and human resource policies (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), leveraging their contacts to
facilitate access to funding (Hochberg et al., 2007), and fostering critical strategic
alliances (Hsu, 2006). In other words, startups often lack a reputation, networks of
contacts, managerial capabilities, and industry know-how, and rely on their investors to
gain immediate access to these resources while gradually building these resources
internally.
Finally, to understand how investors add value to the startups it is necessary to
acknowledge that the matching between investors and startups is not random. On the
contrary, investors that perform well have developed the ability to identify which
ventures are more promising (Amit et al., 1998), and simultaneously the most promising
ventures choose investors with a reputation that may be valuable to the firm (Hsu, 2004).
In a world without frictions, we would expect to see the most reputed and experienced
investors pair up with the most promising startups, not just building winners but picking
them (Baum & Silverman, 2004). Previous research, however, suggests that the dynamics
of this matching process are far from ideal. For instance, the best startups may choose not
to invest in signaling their quality because it is costly (Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1991);
besides, the resources of investors are less valuable if the firm already has some of those
resources (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 1996). Although it is not the goal of this
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chapter to identify the matching and posterior influence processes, I will address the
underlying mechanisms both in the theory and the empirics.

Hypotheses Development
Investors’ Expertise and Firm Performance
Previous research has shown that investors’ resources may impact the venture’s
performance. Investors build a reputation, develop their network of contacts, and learn
their managerial capabilities over time, as they accumulate industry and investment
experience. Then, investors’ experience is a common antecedent to these resources and, a
priori, one would expect that the most seasoned investors are those capable of enhancing
firm performance. However, we know that the process of resource accumulation is filled
with complexities and causal ambiguity (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), and cumulative
experience may be necessary but not sufficient to accumulate these resources. On the
contrary, investors — even the experienced ones — differ substantially in their returns.
Some are persistently better than others (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), which suggests that
some may have resources that confer them with a competitive advantage.
In the process of building a reputation, a network of co-investors, or a network of
portfolio companies, investors’ past successful experience may be especially important.
This is particularly true for venture capital firms, which as financial intermediaries need
to show good performance to future and current investors in order to maintain a
reputation and secure a future flow of investments. Although both taking a company
public and selling the company are considered successful liquidity events, the former has
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a greater potential return — though also a greater risk — and it is used as a way to build a
reputation (Gompers, 1996). Likewise, investors that have taken many companies public
can reach to a portfolio of firms and contacts for resources or to foster strategic alliances
(Hsu, 2006). In addition, as an attractive partner for syndication agreements they may
receive more invitations to new syndicates that help consolidate a network of contacts
(Lerner, 1994a). In short, success tends to feed success, and as investors accumulate
resources that foster performance, they build a competitive advantage that is the basis for
persistent returns.
The idea that investors’ IPO expertise impacts new venture performance is not
new to the literature. It is generally accepted that resources are built and accumulated
through experience and that, in turn, these resources may impact firm performance; in
fact, the reputation of venture capital firms has often been measured by experience (Hsu,
2004; Lerner, 1994a) or IPO experience (Hsu, 2006; Nahata, 2008). Because it has been
shown that IPOs are not as prevalent globally as they are in the United States (Jelic,
Saadouni, & Wright, 2005), 3 it is necessary to establish a baseline effect that will then be
used to measure the moderating role of incentives in the remainder of this chapter.
In sum, those investors that have taken companies public in the past have built a
reputation for being successful and had the opportunity to build a network of portfolio

3

Because M&As are not as prevalent in some countries, investors’ M&A experience may also be
instrumental in building some of these resources, such as a reputation or a network of co-investors.
However, investors’ IPO and M&A experience should be correlated, and the former is still considered in
the industry a signal of success.
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companies, co-investments, and contacts, resources that are valuable for entrepreneurial
ventures and that can impact their performance positively. 4
Hypothesis 2-1: Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired.
Incentives and the Round of Investment
Investors’ expertise, as an antecedent to accumulating valuable resources, may
enhance the venture’s performance. However, for a venture to benefit from the resources
of investors it is necessary that investors share these resources; in other words, the two
organizations must collaborate. The alliance literature has emphasized this need for
collaboration, positing that some organizational complementarities — “the organizational
mechanisms necessary to access the benefits from complementary strategic resources”
(Dyer & Singh, 1998:668) — must be developed in order for firms to create value from
the alliance. Moreover, Lavie (2006) suggests that the creation of value within the
alliance depends not just on the value of the resources of both parties, but on the extent to
which these resources are shared. The remainder of this chapter analyzes three conditions
that moderate investors’ incentives to share their resources with the ventures they fund.
One of the circumstances that change this incentive structure is the round of
investment. As an entrepreneurial venture develops and meets milestones, such as having
a product, starting commercialization, or making profits, investors provide additional
4

Unobserved heterogeneity is a potential concern, since the investors’ expertise at exiting investments
could proxy for a propensity to take companies public. However, these concerns are mitigated for three
reasons: first, the dependent variable also includes the occurrence of an acquisition; second, the decision to
take a company public is the result of consensus among all the investors in the syndicate, so the propensity
of a particular investor may not be as relevant to the outcome; third, there is usually a substantial lag
between the variables.
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stages or rounds of funding for the subsequent phase of development. Staging the
investment in this way is one of the mechanisms investors use to control the risk of their
investment (Gompers, 1995). Then, as the venture goes through more rounds of
investment, there is less uncertainty about the probability of an IPO or an acquisition in
the near future, more investors involved in the firm, and also an asset base capable of
conferring a competitive advantage.
The changes that come with an additional round of investment, however, may also
change the incentives of investors to share their resources and know-how with the firm.
First, as the venture develops, it accumulates resources of its own, partly by taking
advantage of the resources investors may have brought in earlier rounds, such as a
defined set of human resources policies, a capable management team, or promising
commercialization alliances (Hellmann & Puri, 2002; Hsu, 2006). With more in-house
resources, the return to external resources of investors is smaller. In addition, as rounds of
investment unfold the investors’ strategy changes. Early-stage investors tend to have
narrower portfolios to which they devote much time, while later-stage investors tend to
be more diversified and as result devote less attention to each firm. In sum, with more
later-stage investors in the syndicate there is likely to be a smaller effect of investors’
resources on firm performance because of a lesser degree of involvement.
Empirical evidence suggests that investors are more committed to increasing the
value of the startup in the early stages than in the last stages. In a study of the patterns of
syndication (i.e., co-investment) of venture capital firms, Lerner (1994a) found that they
seek partners with similar experience in the first round and less experienced partners in
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later rounds. Although this pattern is consistent with seeking a second opinion, further
research has shown that this syndication also adds value to the venture (Brander, Amit, &
Antweiler, 2002). In addition, qualitative evidence supports the idea that investors in
early rounds contribute to shaping the strategy of entrepreneurial ventures. Gorman and
Sahlman (1989) found that allocation of time is strongly related to the stage at which the
investor enters the firm. Lead investors and investors on the first round tend to attend
monthly meetings, though investors in later rounds tend to go only to quarterly board
meetings. One of the reasons first round investors maintain their presence in further
rounds is explained by the impact of the due diligence process conducted in the first
round of investment. “The relevance of the due diligence process is usually
underestimated,” explained a venture capitalist in an interview. “Due diligence is a valueadded process. When we write the term sheet, we establish the terms for the whole deal,
such as the composition of the management team. At board meetings we just stick to
what we decided then, of course, making changes when necessary.” 5
In sum, even though experienced investors may have accumulated valuable
resources that are capable of enhancing the performance of the venture, this process
requires a transfer of resources. As the venture experiences additional rounds of
investment, the incentives of investors to share their resources diminish.
Hypothesis 2-2: The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired is greater during the first round of
investment than in subsequent rounds.

5

Interview with a venture capitalist, Philadelphia (PA), April 2008.
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Incentives and the Financial Environment
The incentives of investors to share their resources and expertise with the ventures
are moderated not only by the stage of development of the venture, but also by the stage
of development of the financial environment. Even though investors generally prefer
countries with strong financial environments, sometimes they can exploit arbitrage
opportunities in less favorable environments, especially if they have a superior ability to
identify the best deals. Once they make the investment, however, investors are locked in,
because divesting is more difficult than investing. Therefore, they have the right
incentives to share their expertise and their networks of contacts with the venture to
increase its chances of success.
The development of stock markets in general and their liquidity in particular
varies widely across countries and time. According to the World Bank, in 2004 the
turnover of stocks was 126% in the United States and 124% in Germany, but only 35% in
Brazil and 48% in South Africa. Across time, stock market turnover in the United States
increased from 54% in 1990 to 200% in 2001, with a decrease afterwards. Countries that
have experienced rapid economic development have also seen increases in turnover; but
although some countries such as India or Korea have more than doubled their turnover in
the 1990-2004 period, countries such as Brazil have experienced a moderate increase
(from 23% to 35%).
International business researchers have studied the consequences of the variation
of institutions across time, industries, and countries on the functioning of markets
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001) and on the optimal strategies of firms (Guillen,
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2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). A subset of this literature has documented the preference
of investors for countries with well-developed financial institutions (Guler & Guillen,
2010b), especially when they have an active IPO market (Jeng & Wells, 2000). Investors
prefer to invest in countries with a very liquid stock exchange, since this facilitates
divestment. This preference for more stable environments creates opportunities for
arbitrage that investors with superior selection abilities may decide to pursue. The
empirical evidence suggests, however, that in these cases investors may need to adapt
their strategies, for instance by reducing the risk profile of their investments (Guler &
McGahan, 2006) or reducing the number of investors in the syndicate (Guler &
McGahan, 2007).
Nevertheless, investors that pursue opportunities in less liquid financial
environments face more difficulties in divesting or in attracting additional investors to the
firm. As a result, not only they are locked into the investment, but they are the major
source of funds for the venture in the years to come, hence having an incentive to share
their expertise, resources, and networks with the firm in order to increase its chances of
success. This is the case for institutional investors, whose large equity position precludes
a quick divestment and favors a greater activism in corporate governance and operational
decisions (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Pound, 1992). Besides being more active,
investors may introduce the venture to their network of contacts in other countries, which
may facilitate taking the company public in a foreign stock exchange that has better
liquidity conditions than the local one (Hursti & Maula, 2007). Anecdotal evidence from
an interview with the director of a venture capital firm suggests that sharing an investor’s
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international network of contacts may facilitate a firm’s international operations, in turn
facilitating a foreign IPO. 6
Therefore, experienced investors may add value to their portfolio ventures if they
have incentives to share their resources and expertise. When the local stock markets are
not liquid, investors cannot easily divest and in turn they have incentives to collaborate
with the venture to increase the chances of success.
Hypothesis 2-3: The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the liquidity of the local
stock market increases.
Incentives and the Hazard of Expropriation
The incentives of investors to share their resources and expertise with the ventures
also depend on the appropriability of the returns. When the institutional environment is
such that there is a lower likelihood of appropriating the returns, the investors have fewer
incentives to provide the venture with access to their know-how or their networks of
contacts. For investors, the degree of appropriability of returns depends to a great extent
on the political institutions, and in particular on the level of political risk, defined as “the
feasibility of a policy change by the host-country government which either directly —
seizure of assets — or indirectly — adverse change in taxes, regulations or other
agreements — diminishes the multinational’s expected return on assets” (Henisz,
2000:334). Political actors can change the taxation benefits to equity gains, the voting
privileges of investors on the board, the regulation of mergers and acquisitions, or the
6

Interview with the director of the Madrid office of a U.S. venture capital firm, Madrid (Spain), December
2005.
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disclosure requirements in an IPO, all of which affect the extent to which investors
appropriate the value of their investment. Since the investment in startups is long term, an
unstable regulatory environment greatly increases the hazard of expropriation of their
investments, lowering the incentives to share their resources in the first place.
Previous research has shown that investors are less attracted to countries with a
higher hazard of expropriation (Henisz, 2002). However, some firms are able to mitigate
the risks of public expropriation; for instance, although multinational firms take smaller
equity positions in countries with high risk of expropriation, firms with more
international experience take more equity, which seems to indicate some experiential
learning in dealing with these risks (Delios & Henisz, 2000). This experiential learning is
also observed in foreign direct investment, since investors with experience in politically
hazardous countries are more prone to enter countries with high political risks (Delios &
Henisz, 2003). Thus, under some circumstances investors choose countries with higher
political hazards, but adapt their strategies to mitigate those hazards.
In particular, investors that choose to invest in startups located in countries with a
greater hazard of expropriation have fewer incentives to share their resources and
expertise with the startups. Sharing intangible resources, such as their industry or human
resource management know-how, or their networks of contacts, is costly, because it
requires the involvement of the investor’s specialized human resources, which is their
most constrained asset. Investors allocate time and attention across different investments,
and they have an incentive to allot more time to those investments that have a higher
expected return. In addition, sharing an intangible resource always creates a risk of
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imitation, because co-investors may learn from watching their routines, and are
introduced to their network of contacts, improving their own position in the network.
This also creates incentives not to share if there is a higher risk of expropriation.
Therefore, experienced investors may add value to a venture by sharing their
resources with it. However, when the hazard of expropriation is higher, investors have
fewer incentives to make their resources fully available to the ventures, and then I expect
a lower effect of investors’ experience on the startup’s performance.
Hypothesis 2-4: The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the hazard of expropriation
increases.

Methodology
Research Setting
I empirically test the hypotheses in the setting of biotechnology entrepreneurs that
have obtained funding from venture capital firms, strategic partners, governmentsponsored institutions, or financial institutions. Focusing on the biotechnology industry
allows me to define a rather homogeneous measure of quality for the entrepreneurs, based
on patents and publications (Darby & Zucker, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Stuart et al.,
1999), and to control for the standard timing of funding, IPO, and/or acquisition.
Although it would be appealing to study the variation across different types of investors,
they differ greatly in their degree of involvement, the type of resources shared, and the
time allocated to each investment. To avoid this noise, I choose to focus on venture
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capital firms, building on a vast literature that documents how they tend to share their
expertise, resources, and networks with their portfolio firms (Gompers & Lerner, 2004;
Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). To gain a better understanding of the processes underlying
the motivations of venture capitalists, I conducted informal interviews with venture
capital firms and biotechnology firms.
Sample
Using VentureXpert I collected all biotechnology firms that received funding
from any investor, including angels, venture capital firms, and government-sponsored
programs, and that were founded between 1990 and 2004. VentureXpert, the most
comprehensive cross-national database of investments, collects the full investment
history for each firm, including funding by government-affiliated institutions, financial
institutions, strategic investors, or venture capital firms. The database has been widely
used in both the entrepreneurship (Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Sahlman, 1990; Shane &
Stuart, 2002) and the multinational literatures (Guler & Guillen, 2010a, 2010b; Guler &
McGahan, 2006, 2007).
Since the window of observation is 2005 and all the independent variables are
lagged, I include in the analyses only firms that are in the sample at least 2 years. The
final sample comprises 688 firms from as many as 30 different countries (see Table 1).
To maximize the variation in the external environment, the sample includes all firms
founded outside the United States and a 10% random sample of the firms founded within
the United States; sensitivity analyses were conducted excluding the U.S. firms to address
potential concerns.
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Table 2-1. Sample Description by Country of Origin
Country

Ventures

VC- IPOs M&As Founded
Duration Venturebacked
(average)
(average)
years
Australia
32
14
5
3
1999
4.9
121
Austria
4
4
1
1
1999
6.3
21
Belgium
12
7
2
0
2000
4.8
46
Brazil
7
4
0
0
2000
5.1
29
Canada
51
38
9
6
1998
6.1
246
China
3
0
1
0
1997
5.3
13
Denmark
26
16
0
2
2000
5.0
93
Finland
17
9
0
2
1997
7.3
101
France
55
45
2
3
1998
6.6
280
Germany
142
121
10
15
1998
6.5
748
Hungary
1
1
0
0
1998
7.0
6
India
7
2
2
0
1994
8.7
54
Ireland
7
5
0
0
1998
6.9
38
Israel
23
14
3
0
1998
6.6
121
Italy
2
1
0
0
2002
3.5
5
Japan
6
6
3
0
1998
6.3
28
Malaysia
2
1
0
0
2002
3.5
5
Netherlands
12
9
2
2
1998
5.7
49
New Zealand
1
0
0
0
1995
9.0
8
Norway
11
10
0
1
1997
7.8
67
Portugal
2
2
0
0
1999
6.0
10
Rep. of Korea
57
35
5
2
1999
6.1
292
Singapore
2
1
0
0
2002
3.0
4
South Africa
1
1
0
0
1999
6.0
5
Spain
8
2
0
0
2000
4.6
29
Sweden
25
22
0
1
1998
6.2
122
Switzerland
19
19
4
3
1999
5.2
79
Turkey
1
0
0
0
1999
6.0
5
United Kingdom
75
52
8
14
1998
6.1
362
United Statesa
77
70
10
15
1997
6.4
372
Total
688
511
67
70
1998
6.2
3,359
a
For firms founded in the United States, analyses use a 10% random sample of the population;
for other countries, all firms are included.

Firms are followed since founding until they experience an IPO or an acquisition,
or until 2005, and drop from the sample when they go bankrupt, spanning a total of 3,359
venture-years, which is the unit of analysis. The sample is entrepreneurial by nature, as
these are high-technology, private ventures, observed on average for their first seven
years of existence (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000).
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Out of the total sample, I observe funding by a venture capital firm at some point
in time for 511 of them (see Table 1). Because VC backing is not an inherent
characteristic of a firm but rather changes across rounds and time, and because VC
backing varies dramatically across countries, suggesting that it may be influenced by the
variation in financial institutions and the hazard of appropriation, I keep both VC- and
non-VC-backed firms.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the occurrence of the first IPO in any stock exchange
around the world or the occurrence of an Acquisition. Because stock markets vary to the
extent that ventures can successfully attempt an IPO, and because on some occasions an
acquisition is preferred (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2007), it is important to consider both
liquidity events. 7 In fact, Table 1 shows that the distribution of both liquidity events
varies dramatically across countries, which may evidence the heterogeneity in financial
institutions across different countries, underscoring the need to include acquisitions in the
analysis.
Although it would be attractive to consider the valuation of the liquidity event
and not just the occurrence, this raises serious comparability concerns. First, it would
exclude from the analyses the ventures for which no event is observed, creating a bias
towards the best performers. Second, it is difficult to compare the valuation of IPOs and
acquisitions, because they are determined through very different processes. Finally, even
comparing IPO valuations would be problematic, as there are 15 different stock
7

For four firms in the sample there was a reverse merger (i.e., the acquisition of a public company in order
to bypass the process of an IPO). In the analyses these are also coded as a Liquidity Event.
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exchanges involved, with 3 firms going public exclusively in a foreign stock exchange
and 4 firms going public in the local stock exchange and a foreign stock exchange
simultaneously.
The occurrence of a liquidity event is characterized both by the Durationi, i.e., the
number of years the venture is observed since its founding, and the LiquidityEventit
indicator, which measures the occurrence of an event and its timing. Consider a firm that
experiences an IPO in year 4: the Duration is 4 and the LiquidityEventit indicator is 0 for
the three first years and 1 for the fourth year. If the observation were censored, then the
LiquidityEventit indicator would be 0 for all years. Out of the 688 ventures in the sample,
approximately 20% experience an IPO or an acquisition during the period of observation,
and they are observed 7 years on average. The occurrence of an event was determined
using a variety of sources, including VentureXpert, SDC Platinum (Global Issues and
M&A Databases), Zephyr, stock exchanges’ websites, and company websites. All
potential IPOs and acquisitions were confirmed with the Dow Jones Factiva news
database, distinguishing real acquisitions from a sale of assets after bankruptcy.
Independent Variables
Syndicate variables. I measure the experience of the investors for each ventureyear as the total number of IPOs that venture capital firms have been involved in since
founding up to that year. Using the whole VentureXpert database, I computed for each
year and for each venture capital firm in the sample the number of past investments that
ended up in an IPO, going back to 1967. For each venture-year, I calculate the sum of the
experience of all venture capital firms. This measure is parsimonious and it respects the
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idea that venture capital firms invite other firms to the syndicate not just to share
financial responsibility, but also to take advantage of their expertise and capabilities
(Brander et al., 2002). Then, the Experiencei,t-1 variable computes for each venture i the
total number of IPOs in which any of the venture capital firms in the syndicate has been
involved since it was founded until t-1. As a result, the variable varies across time when:
a) more venture capital firms join the syndicate, and b) venture capital firms in the
syndicate gain experience.
Two indicators measure the round of investment: Round1it and OtherRoundit (for
second and subsequent rounds); the omitted category is an indicator of the venture-years
prior to the first round. I compute Experience*Round1i,t-1 as the interaction of
Experiencei,t-1 and Round1i,t-1, and Experience*OtherRoundi,t-1 as the interaction of
Experiencei,t-1 and OtherRoundi,t-1. Note that before the first round Experience is 0,
because there are no investors.
Other variables that describe the syndicate of investors are: a) SizeOfSyndicateit,
which is a count of all the investors — whether they are venture capital firms or not — in
the syndicate for each venture-year; b) an indicator of whether there is a
FinancialInstitutionit in the syndicate for each venture-year; and c) VCit, an indicator of
whether there is a venture capital firm in the syndicate for each venture-year.
Country variables. Hypotheses 2-3 and 2-4 refer to the interaction between
Experiencei,t-1 and institutional variables. Following the finance tradition, I operationalize
the liquidity of the stock exchange market as the turnover ratio of stocks traded
(Turnoverit), from the World Bank Development Indicators. I measure the hazard of
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expropriation using the political constraints index developed by Henisz (2002), which
estimates the feasibility of a policy change by taking into account the checks and
balances among political actors. I define the variable Expropriationit as one minus the
Polcon index, so the final variable increases with the expropriation hazard.
To account for the cross-country institutional variation, I build on Guler and
Guillen (2010b) and control for the level of economic development, as the GDP per
capita (PPP), and for the stock exchange market capitalization, as percentage of the GDP,
both from the World Bank. All regressions include country fixed effects for the most
frequent countries. In unreported regressions I controlled for whether a country is a
common law country (from the World Bank) and for new listings in stock markets (from
the World Federation of Exchanges, available since 1995).
Venture characteristics. Patents and publications are the typical indicator of
quality for a biotechnology firm (Darby & Zucker, 2002). For each of the venture-years I
compiled the total number of patents (at the application date) affiliated with the firm,
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This is a homogeneous measure of quality
across different countries, because “in the biotechnology industry firms usually patent in
the most relevant countries at the same time in order to ensure protection.” 8 I compiled
all the publications of scientists affiliated with the venture for each venture-year using the
ISI Web of Knowledge. The Patentsit and Publicationsit variables measure the stock of
patents/publications of venture i at time t, for each venture-year.
Besides venture quality, I control for: a) YearOfFoundingi, to control for the year
the venture enters the sample, b) BioPharmai, an indicator of whether the main activity of
8

Interview with a patent lawyer, Philadelphia (PA), September 2007.
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the firm is biopharmaceuticals, c) and Spin-offi, which is 1 if the firm is a spin-off of a
pharmaceutical company or a research institution.
Analyses
Given that the dependent variable is coded as one if, and only if, a liquidity event
takes place, and zero otherwise, not only there is a strong dependence across time, but
also right censoring for those ventures that do not experience an event during the window
of observation. The most appropriate technique to deal with this data structure is event
history analysis; I estimate Cox regression models, which do not impose a particular
functional form on the underlying hazard of an event. I chose the venture-year as the unit
of analysis because most of the independent variables vary yearly. Lastly, the Cox model
specification does not assume the proportionality of hazards when time-dependent
covariates are included (Allison, 1995).
In addition, there is a potential endogeneity problem because of the non-random
matching between investors and ventures, which is such that investors try to select the
most promising ventures and ventures try to select the most reputed investors (Amit et al.,
1991; Hsu, 2004). The nature of the dependent variable attenuates the concerns with
some sources of endogeneity, since it is more difficult to predict when or if a liquidity
event will happen than it is to predict financial performance Nevertheless, it is important
to address the matching empirically. The ideal way to deal with this problem is to
develop (1) a self-selection model, including (2) an exogenous instrument to control for
the matching on unobservable characteristics, and then (3) include the correction on the
second stage. I consider these three components one at a time.
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Departing from the literature on alliance formation (Gulati, 1995; Podolny, 1994;
Stuart, 1998) and following Bottazzi et al. (2008), I generate all potential matches
between investors and ventures by matching for each year all syndicates that were
actively searching for investments and all ventures that were active in the sample. Then, I
estimate the likelihood of an actual match using a probit model. In this model I
incorporate interactions of the characteristics of the investors that may potentially join
with characteristics of the investors in t-1, to control for patterns in the firms that are
invited. I control, as well, for the potential matching between investors and high-quality
ventures.
Besides a matching on the observed variables there is also a potential matching on
unobserved characteristics, 9 and so an exogenous instrument should be included in the
selection model as an additional regressor. Previous research has used the supply of funds
in the geographical area as an exogenous instrument for the matching (Berger, Miller,
Petersen, Rajan, & Stein, 2005). I operationalize this supply following Bottazzi et al.
(2008) by generating a set of Country Pairs Fixed Effects. 10
The issue of how to incorporate a self-selection model with an event history
analysis on the second stage is challenging. The ideal would be to estimate both stages
jointly, as in Heckman (1979), but this is computationally complex. A cost-effective
alternative involves a two-step approach, estimating first the selection model and

9

In fact, Sørensen found strong evidence of matching on unobserved variables (2007).
For instance, if the venture is from Australia, and there are two investors from Germany and the U.K, the
country pairs Australia-Germany and Australia-UK are 1 for that year, and all other country pairs are 0.
10
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calculating the Inverse Mill’s ratio, which is then used in the second stage. 11 Although
the two-step approach has been widely used as an approximation in different contexts (Lu
& Ma, 2008; Shaver, 1998), it should be interpreted with caution (Murphy & Topel,
1985). 12

Results
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. On average, the syndicate of investors
has an Experience of 11.6 IPOs, increasing with the round of investment. There is
significant correlation among the main interactions. In non-reported regressions I
centered the variables, but because results did not change I report the more parsimonious
regressions. Even though the presence of multicollinearity does not bias the coefficients,
it increases the variance, making the test more conservative.

11

The intuition for this technique is found in the idea of Inverse Probability Weighting estimators
(Wooldridge, 2002b), and has some common ground with the propensity score estimation (Wooldridge,
2002a).
12
In particular, standard errors may be biased. I repeated the analysis using bootstrap; while results were
mostly robust, the levels of significance dropped in some specifications.
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Table 2-2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

LiquidityEventi,t a
Durationi a
Experiencei,t-1
Experience
*Round1,t-1
Experience
*OtherRoundi,t-1
Experience
*Turnoveri,t-1
Experience
*Expropriation i,t-1
Round1i, t-1
OtherRound i, t-1
VCi,t-1
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
Financial
Institutioni, t-1
Expropriationi,t-1
Turnoveri,t-1
GDPi,t-1
StockMarketCapi,t-1
Patentsi,t-1
Publicationsi,t-1
BioPharmai
YearOfFoundingi
Spin-offi

mean s.d.
min max 1
2
3
0.19 0.39
0
1
7.42 2.96
2
15 -.03
11.6 37.2
0
366 .14 .03

4

5

6

7

8

2.22 13.78

0

291 .07 -.06 .33

9.39 35.18

0

366 .12 .06 .93 -.04

13.5

52.6

0

741 .10 .03 .91 .25 .87

6.61
0.40
0.22
0.47
1.62

21.8
0.49
0.41
0.50
2.34

0
0
0
0
0

219
1
1
1
21

.14
-.09
.10
.06
.09

.04
-.15
.05
-.03
.01

.99
-.13
.45
.34
.57

.31
.20
-.09
.17
.09

.93
-.22
.50
.28
.57

.92
-.12
.38
.27
.50

-.13
.44 -.43
.32 .35
.55 .02

0.21
0.54
1.11
25.3
88.4
1.30
3.25
0.36
1997
0.23
9
.46
.61

0.40
0.08
0.69
5.92
52.3
3.20
16.4
0.48
3.07
0.42
10

0
0.26
0.09
1.64
3.55
0
0
0
1990
0
11

1
1
3.80
35.4
322
40
309
1
2003
1
12

.03
.03
-.08
.04
.10
.12
.02
.14
-.22
.13
13

-.04
.03
-.10
-.10
-.06
.17
.06
-.13
-.91
-.09
14

.16
.10
.03
.21
.14
.28
.11
.09
-.07
.07
15

-.01
.03
-.02
.07
.07
.01
.01
.06
.02
.04
16

.17
.10
.04
.20
.12
.29
.12
.08
-.08
.06
17

.13
.11
.11
.23
.13
.23
.09
.07
-.05
.03
18

.14
.14
.03
.26
.15
.27
.11
.09
-.07
.06
19

.13
.01
.13
-.09
-.08
-.10
.01
-.04
.18
-.04
20

10. VCi,t-1
.58
11. SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
12. Financial
Institutioni, t-1
.32
.21
.55
.08
.05
.03 -.04
13. Expropriationi,t-1
.04
.09
.04
.01 .27
14. Turnoveri,t-1
.23
.19
.20
.07 .00 -.18
15. GDPi,t-1
.11
.04
.06 -.01 .12 -.12 .45
16. StockMarketCapi,t-1
.33
.23
.37
.17 .03 -.03 .17 .13
17. Patentsi,t-1
.12
.15
.15
.07 .05 -.04 .01 .01 .18
18. Publicationsi,t-1
.14
.13
.15
.10 .03 -.07 .16 .05 .08 .04
19. BioPharmai
-.06
.02
-.02
.06 -.06 .14 .12 .04 -.19 -.07 .09
20. YearOfFoundingi
.09
.04
.07
.06 .08 -.10 .10 .20 .11 .01 .14 .07
21. Spin-offi
Data from all countries; not weighted (common statistical packages do not allow weights with
longitudinal data); all correlations larger than 0.03 are significant at p < 0.05; n = 3,359 ventureyears.
a
Dependent variable.
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The estimation results from the selection model are shown in Table 3. Crossing all
active syndicates of investors with all active ventures for each year results in 185,798
venture-years. To account for the non-independence of observations, I run a pooled probit
regression clustering by venture, and I introduce year fixed effects. 13 The exogenous
instruments are the Country Pairs Fixed Effects, which are highly significant. Both the
characteristics of the incumbent syndicate and the characteristics of the matching
syndicate significantly predict the occurrence of a matching. Overall the model shows
good fit, with a pseudo R2 of 50%. Using this model, I computed the Inverse Mill’s ratio,
which is then added as a regressor on the second stage. As shown in Table 4, the
coefficient for the Inverse Mill’s Ratio is significant across specifications, suggesting the
presence of a non-random matching on the first stage.

13

I do so because each venture appears multiple times per year and it is not feasible to use a fixed effects
panel data model.
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Table 2-3. Results of Probit Analysis on the Probability of Matching
(Selection)a

Matching
VCi,t
-1.25**
(0.36)
VCi,t*VCi,t-1
-0.47**
(0.11)
VCi,t*Experiencei,t-1 b
0.00
(0.00)
VCi,t*Patent stock i,t-1
0.02
(0.02)
VCi,t*GDPi,t-1
0.03*
(0.01)
Syndicate controls
Experiencei,t-1 b
-0.01
(0.01)
VCi,t-1
0.44**
(0.10)
Round1i,t-1
0.28**
(0.06)
OtherRound i,t-1
0.28**
(0.07)
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
0.10**
(0.02)
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
-0.16*
(0.07)
Venture’s country controls
Expropriationi,t-1
0.63
(0.61)
Turnover i,t-1
0.08
(0.06)
GDP i,t-1
-0.05**
(0.01)
StockMarketCapi,t-1 b
-0.01
(0.01)
Venture’s controls
Patentsi,t-1
0.00
(0.01)
Publicationsi,t-1 b
-0.03**
(0.01)
BioPharmai
-0.02
(0.05)
YearOfFoundingi
-0.00
(0.01)
Spin-offi
-0.12†
(0.07)
Constant
9.63
(21.82)
Country Pairs Fixed Effects
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
a
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 185,798 (all
possible matches between active syndicates and ventures).
b
Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly
transformed (divided by 10); for interpretation, divide the
coefficient by 10.
† p < 0.10
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01

Table 4 shows the results of the hypotheses testing on the second stage. The
estimates for the control variables are robust across specifications. Hypothesis 2-1
predicts that syndicates with more IPO experience will enhance the likelihood of the
venture going public or being acquired. In support of hypothesis 2-1, the effect of
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Experience is positive and significant (model 1), even when it is divided by round
(models 2-5). Interestingly, the estimate for having a VC in the syndicate is positive but
insignificant across specifications once the Experience of the venture capital firms is
accounted for, suggesting that the process by which venture capital firms contribute to
adding value is indeed through their resources and expertise.

Table 2-4. Results of Cox Regression on the Hazard of an IPO or an Acquisition
Dependent Variablea
Hypotheses
(H2-1) Experiencei,t-1b
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*Round1,t-1
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*OtherRound,t-1
(H2-3) Experiencei,t-1*Turnover i,t-1
(H2-4) Experiencei,t-*Expropriationi,t-1
Syndicate Controls
VCi,t-1
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
Round1,t-1
OtherRound,t-1
Venture Controls
Patentsi,t-1
Publicationsi,t-1b
BioPharmai
Spin-offi
YearOfFounding
Country Controls
Turnover i,t-1
Expropriationi,t-1
GDP i,t-1
StockMarketCapi,t-1b
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc
Country Fixed Effects

IPO or
M&A
(1)

IPO or
M&A
(2)

0.04* (0.02)

IPO or
M&A
(3)

0.09*
0.03

(0.03)
(0.02)

0.16**
0.11**
-0.07*

(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.03)

0.30
0.22
0.02
0.69†
0.88*

(0.30)
(0.23)
(0.04)
(0.35)
(0.40)

0.25
0.21
0.03
0.66†
0.95*

(0.30)
(0.23)
(0.04)
(0.35)
(0.41)

0.24
0.21
0.03
0.63†
0.85*

(0.30)
(0.23)
(0.04)
(0.35)
(0.41)

0.04*
0.02
0.51**
0.11
0.12**

(0.07)
(0.04)
(0.18)
(0.21)
(0.04)

0.04*
0.02
0.51**
0.11
0.11**

(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.18)
(0.21)
(0.04)

0.03*
0.02
0.51**
0.10
0.12**

(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.18)
(0.21)
(0.04)

0.19
-2.61
-0.02
0.04†
1.15**
Yes

(0.24)
(2.08)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.43)

0.20
-2.50
-0.02
0.04†
1.09*
Yes

(0.23)
(2.06)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.43)

0.45†
-2.63
-0.02
0.04
1.08*
Yes

(0.26)
(2.06)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.43)

(continues…)
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(…continued)

Dependent Variablea

IPO or
M&A
(4)

IPO or
M&A
(5)

Hypotheses
(H2-1) Experiencei,t-1b
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*Round1,t-1
0.35** (0.11)
0.39**
(0.11)
(H2-2) Experiencei,t-1*OtherRound,t-1
0.31** (0.12)
0.36**
(0.12)
(H2-3) Experiencei,t-1*Turnover i,t-1
-0.06*
(0.03)
(H2-4) Experiencei,t-1*Expropriationi,t-1
-0.48* (0.20)
-0.43*
(0.20)
Syndicate Controls
VCi,t-1
0.23
(0.30)
0.22
(0.30)
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
0.16
(0.23)
0.17
(0.23)
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
0.03
(0.04)
0.03
(0.04)
Round1,t-1
0.67† (0.35)
0.64†
(0.35)
OtherRound,t-1
0.94* (0.41)
0.85*
(0.41)
Venture Controls
Patentsi,t-1
0.03* (0.02)
0.03*
(0.02)
Publicationsi,t-1b
0.02
(0.04)
0.01
(0.04)
BioPharmai
0.54** (0.18)
0.53**
(0.18)
Spin-offi
0.03
(0.22)
0.02
(0.22)
YearOfFounding
0.11** (0.04)
0.11**
(0.04)
Country Controls
Turnover i,t-1
0.14
(0.23)
0.42
(0.26)
Expropriationi,t-1
-0.27
(2.19)
-0.63
(2.21)
GDP i,t-1
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
StockMarketCapi,t-1b
0.04* (0.02)
0.04*
(0.02)
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc
1.11* (0.43)
1.09*
(0.43)
Country Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
a
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 3,359; country fixed effects for
United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Rep. of Korea.
b
Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided
by 10); for interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10.
c
Inverse Mill’s Ratio calculated from the results of the selection equation (stage 1).
† p < 0.10
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01

Hypothesis 2-2 predicts that the effect of Experience should be greater on the first
round than in other rounds. Model 2 modifies model 1 by testing separately the IPO
experience of venture capital firms in the first round (Experience*Round1) and in other
rounds (Experience*OtherRound). Models 3 to 5 maintain this division while adding
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other independent variables. Considering all the models as a whole, the coefficient of
Experience in both rounds is positive and significant. A two-tailed test of the difference
of the coefficients supports that Experience*Round1 is greater than Experience*Round2,
with p < 0.5 in model 2 and p < 0.1 in models 3 to 5. This evidence supports hypothesis
2-2.
Hypothesis 2-3 predicts that the effect of Experience on the likelihood of a
LiquidityEvent is attenuated when the turnover of the stock exchange is greater. As
expected, the main effect of the stock exchange Turnover on the likelihood of a liquidity
event is positive, although generally not significant. The interaction of
Experience*Turnover, however, is negative and significant both in the partial and full
models (3 and 5, respectively). Note that these results control for many other institutional
variables, such as the GDP, the stock market capitalization, and country fixed effects for
the most frequent countries.
Hypothesis 2-4 predicts that the effect of Experience on the likelihood of a
LiquidityEvent is attenuated when the expropriation hazard is higher. Consistent with the
literature on political risk (Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003), the main effect of
Expropriation is negative. In support of hypothesis 2-4, the interaction of
Experience*Expropriation is negative as well.
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Figure 2-1. Effect of Experience by Level of Turnover
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Experience(IPO)
This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in
Experience at three levels of Turnover: mean, and plus/minus one standard error. An
increase of a standard deviation in the Experience of the syndicate (that is, 37
additional IPOs), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by: a) 133% if
Turnover is one standard deviation below the mean; b) 118% if Turnover is at the
mean; c) 103% if Turnover is at the mean plus one standard deviation

The results are not only significant, but economically meaningful as well. Figure
2-1 shows how the effect of Experience on the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition varies
across different levels of Turnover. An increase in the Experience variable equivalent to
one standard deviation (i.e. 37 IPOs) more than triples the hazard of the venture going
public or being acquired. However, this effect varies across different levels of Turnover:
the hazard of an IPO or acquisition increases by 103% when Turnover is high (one
standard deviation above the mean); the same effect is 133% when Turnover is low (one
standard deviation above the mean).
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Figure 2-2 presents the same information for the interaction of Experience with
the Expropriation Hazard. The difference across expropriation environments is greater
than in the previous figure. An increase in one standard deviation in the Experience
variables (i.e. 37 IPOs), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by 62% if the is
a low Expropriation Hazard (one standard deviation below the mean). The increase in the
hazard is roughly half (34%) when the Expropriation Hazard is high (one standard
deviation above the mean).
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Figure 2-2. Effect of Experience by Level of Expropriation Hazard

Experience(IPO)
This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in
Experience at three levels of Expropriation Hazard: mean, and plus/minus one
standard error. An increase of a standard deviation in the Experience of the syndicate
(that is, 37 additional IPOs), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by: a)
62% if Expropriation is one standard deviation below the mean; b) 48% if
Expropriation is at the mean; c) 34% if Expropriation is at the mean plus one
standard deviation.
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The effects of controls are very robust among specifications. As expected, a
venture with a higher stock of patents — effective signals of its quality — has a higher
likelihood of going public or being acquired. Ventures whose main activity is BioPharma
have also higher propensities to go public or be acquired. Against the expectations, GDP
is not significant. The correlations in Table 2 show that GDP is positively correlated with
the occurrence of a LiquidityEvent and negatively correlated with the Duration of the
venture. However, these correlations are moderately small (4% and -10%, respectively),
so the power of the test may not be sufficient to find an effect.
Different sensitivity analyses were conducted to ensure the robustness of the
results. In the first stage I included more interactions between the joining investors and
the current investors, which did not alter the final results. In addition, I conducted all
analyses excluding the ventures founded in the United States to address potential
concerns with the sampling methodology, finding the same qualitative results. I also
considered different operationalizations of the Experience variable. I aggregated the
experience across members of the syndicate in different ways; in particular, using the
maximum experience instead of the total yields mostly consistent results, with a loss of
significance in hypothesis 2-3. When I operationalized Experience as the number of IPOs
in the biotechnology industry, instead of considering all industries, results were generally
stronger, which supports the fact that industry experience is very relevant (Gompers,
Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008). Finally, I included as a control the experience
measured as the number of previous investments, regardless of whether there was an IPO.
This variable was consistently not significant across specifications, even when the
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Experience variable was not included, suggesting that it is not the size of the investor that
matters, but its valuable resources.

Discussion and Conclusion
Even though the expertise, resources, and networks of contacts of investors can
add value to a venture (Hsu, 2006; Stuart et al., 1999), investors must have the right
incentives to share their resources with the venture. I argued that these incentives are
greater in the early stages of the venture, when there is a greater dependency on the
investor; results showed that the effect of investors’ expertise on the performance of a
venture is attenuated in the second and subsequent rounds. The incentives of investors to
share their resources should also vary with the institutional environment. I found that
when financial institutions are less developed the effect of investors’ expertise on a
venture’s performance is enhanced, and that when political institutions make the hazard
of expropriation higher, the effect of investors’ expertise is attenuated, indicating that
there are fewer incentives to share their resources with the venture.
The finding that investors’ experience enhances the performance of their portfolio
ventures is consistent with the broader literature, which analyzes how organizations learn
from experience and accumulate resources capable of conferring upon them a
competitive advantage (Argote, 1999; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). It is more surprising that
only successful experience has a greater effect on performance, and not general
cumulative experience. Although there may be learning from failure, some investors’
resources, such as their reputation or their networks of contacts, are built more
consistently from successes than from failures.
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The core argument that investors’ resources increase the performance of startups
is grounded in the resource-dependence perspective. Previous empirical tests of this
theory have focused on firms subject to great uncertainty, such as those near bankruptcy
(Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Gales & Kesner, 1994) or young public firms (Kor &
Misangyi, 2008; Kroll et al., 2007). This chapter adds to that literature by analyzing both
public and private firms since the time of inception, and how the impact of investors on
performance varies as the resource-dependencies of the venture evolve. The findings
imply that when there is a lesser dependency on the environment, investors have fewer
incentives to share their resources. This chapter also adds to empirical tests of resourcedependence by providing another measure for the resources of investors. While previous
literature has focused on the effect of different board compositions, such as the
proportion of outside directors or the number of interlocks, as a proxy for the top
management team’s exposure to external resources (Daily & Dalton, 1994a; Pfeffer,
1972), this chapter has considered the experience of investors as antecedent to the knowhow, resources, and networks of contacts.
The argument that investors have to share their resources to add value to the
invested firm is grounded on the alliance literature, which has analyzed how firms within
a network have to collaborate in order to create value from the relationship (Dyer &
Singh, 1998; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). Previous literature proposes a distinction
between shared and non-shared resources, arguing that the nature of the relationship is as
important as the nature of the resources (Lavie, 2006). This chapter empirically tests the
idea that across different contexts, the nature of the relationship between two
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organizations — in this case, investors and ventures — varies, and so does value creation
within the partnership.
Finally, in this chapter I have sought to explain how the effect of investors’
resources varies with changes in the institutional environment. International business
scholars have found that the optimal strategy may vary with the context; for instance,
related diversification is considered best practice in western countries, but conglomerates
provide an advantage in the absence of strong institutional environments (Guillen, 2000;
Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The findings in this chapter suggest that the incentives of
investors to share their resources vary with the development of stock markets and the
stability of political institutions, which implies that the strategic choice to share the
resources also varies with the institutional environment.
These results have implications for both investors and startups. An investor faces
a choice between having more firms in the portfolio that compete for attention and
resources, and having a smaller portfolio to which the investor can add more value. This
chapter suggests that the optimal amount of attention and resources provided to each firm
in the portfolio may vary with the stage of development, the development of the financial
institutions, and the stability of the political institutions. The managers of startups have to
decide whom to seek funding from and, in case of receiving more than one offer which
one to select. Hsu (2004) shows that startups are willing to accept a lower valuation from
a more reputed investor, with the hope that such an investor will add value to their firm.
The findings in this chapter suggest that, in doing so, the managers of startups should
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consider not just the reputation, but also the incentives investors will have to effectively
share their resources.
This study is not without limitations. There are concerns with the generalizability
of the results to industries other than biotechnology, whose peculiarities include a long
maturity cycle, a greater environmental uncertainty, and a great need for funding, which
may affect the degree to which a firm depends on external resources. Results should be
more generalizable to other high-technology industries, which share some of these same
features. Another concern is whether the results can be generalized to investors other than
venture capital firms. Although VC firms are usually considered unique, other investors
fulfill a very similar role. For instance, many research institutions provide consultancy
services to startups that are similar to those offered by venture capital firms; corporate
venture capital programs are very similar in nature, as well. To the extent that other
investors have similar business models and resources, the results in the chapter can be
generalized. Nevertheless, it is important to be cautious, because the objectives of
research institutions or corporate venture capital firms may differ from those of venture
capitalists (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005) in ways that affect, among others, the definition
of performance.
Finally, the matching between investors and ventures is such that we may observe
more pairings between experienced investors and promising firms that we would expect
randomly. In this chapter I have controlled for this self-selection by estimating the
probability of a matching in the first stage, and controlling for this probability in the
second stage. However, with a Cox regression model in the second stage this technique
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provides only an approximation to the matching problem, as discussed in the methods
section. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with previous research on the separation
of the matching process from the ulterior performance effect, which finds evidence of
both processes (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Fitza et al., 2009).
This chapter has sought to unveil some of the processes by which investors
provide ventures with their resources, and how those processes are moderated by the
context. Although this is not the first study to analyze the process and context in the
investor-venture relationship, most previous research has focused on the content. The link
between investors’ resources and firm performance depends on the type of resources and
the type of investors, but it also depends on how investors decide to share their resources
and the contextual factors that moderate both the investors’ strategy and the effectiveness
of investors’ resources. Further research is needed to better understand the
interrelationships among content, process, and context.
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3. Investors’ Experience and Innovative Outcomes
Introduction
Venture capital investments are usually associated with innovative firms, and
many countries have fostered their development with the hope to foster their innovation
output. Naturally, venture capital firms enhance the innovation of firms by providing the
financial resources that are needed in the research and development process. The
literature has also shown that venture capital firms tend to invest in those firms that are
more innovative (Bottazzi & Da Rin, 2002). Nevertheless, besides picking the most
promising firms and providing them with financial resources, investors act also as
resource providers and enhance the performance of firms. It is yet an open question,
however, whether investors can contribute to the research processes of high technology
entrepreneurs above and beyond providing the financial resources.
The resource provision role of investors has been documented in the resourcedependence empirical literature, showing that the networks of external directors are
beneficial in cases of high uncertainty (Boyd, 1990; Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b). The
entrepreneurial finance literature has shown that investors influence entrepreneurial firm
performance by fostering strategic product commercialization alliances (Hsu, 2006), or
by professionalizing the top management team and human resource practices of the firm
(Hellmann & Puri, 2002). While there is general agreement that investors can influence
the financial performance of their portfolio firm, scarce attention has been paid to
whether they can also influence their innovative outcomes. Kortum and Lerner (2000)
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found that even after controlling for selection, venture capital investments have fostered
innovation at an industry level in the United States in the 80’s. Yet, whether this effect
would exist in different institutional environments is still an open question.
This chapter seeks to address this gap by analyzing how investors the innovative
outcomes of firms across different institutional environments. I start by analyzing the
baseline effect of experienced investors on the innovative outcomes of firms, recognizing
that the effect may differ for the commercial research and the basic science research.
Innovation scholars have shown that applied and basic research have very complex
dynamics, finding that patents and publications are at the same time complements, with
the existence of patent-publication pairs (Huang & Murray, 2009), and substitutes, for the
research effort is divided between the two research programs (Cockburn, Henderson, &
Stern, 2002). In this chapter I analyze how investors influence both patents and
publications, and suggest the mechanisms that may drive this effect.
While experienced investors may enhance both patents and publications, this
impact may not be constant across different environments. Resource-dependence theory
poses that in dealing with uncertainty firms enhance their performance when they secure
access to critical external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The innovation processes
of firms are naturally subject to both technological and market uncertainty, but also to a
more regulatory and political risk, which may put incentives or obstacles to different
streams of research. This is particularly salient in fields like biotechnology, whose ethical
implications derive in regulatory and political tensions. In this chapter I will argue that
experienced investors can have a greater impact on the innovative outcomes of firms
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when there is higher political and regulatory risk. In particular, this moderation effect
should be stronger for patents than for publications, since the former are subject to the
regulatory environment at all times. The empirical setting of this dissertation is
particularly well suited to answer these issues, since it provides institutional variation
across thirty different countries along more than a decade, also allowing me to compare
the impact of investors on both patents and publications. In this chapter the sample was
restricted to the period of 1991 to 2002 to reduce the concerns with the patent lag. I find
that having more experienced venture capital firms enhances the patent count and patent
citations as well as the publications. The effect of experienced investors on the patents is
stronger when there is greater political and regulatory risk, or in other words, when there
is greater hazard of expropriation, indicating that the experience of investors is valuable
in dealing with the uncertainty posed in these situations. This moderating effect does not
hold for publications, which are less subject to the regulatory uncertainty of the local
country.

Theory and Hypotheses Development
Investors and the Innovative Outcomes of Firms
Research has shown that investors such as venture capital firms enhance the
innovative outcomes of firms (Kortum & Lerner, 2000), less attention has been paid to
the mechanisms by which this happens. Past research has focused on two processes:
access to capital, and selection of investments. Access to capital is indeed relevant for the
R&D activities, which tend to be intensive in financial resources. In fact, venture capital
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firms have specialized in high technology entrepreneurial firms that require large sums of
money relative to the uncertainty that surrounds them (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Gorman
& Sahlman, 1989). Research has shown consistently that firms that are backed by a
venture capital firm are associated with higher performance, and one of the major
rationales for this is the access to capital. Nevertheless, there is also evidence of
persistence of returns of certain investors (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), which indicates that
while financial capital is an asset, there are other knowledge-based resources that are
critical for the firms they invest in. In particular, I showed in the previous chapter that
venture capital firms with more experience tend to provide similar amounts of money, but
they also provide additional resources that have an impact on the firm’s outcomes.
The second mechanism discussed in previous literature is selection of investments.
Naturally, the selection is not random and venture capital firms and other investors have
developed capabilities to screen and select the most promising ventures (Amit et al.,
1991; Baum & Silverman, 2004; Gompers, 1995). Nevertheless, research suggests that
even after accounting for this selection mechanisms, venture capital firms had an
influence of the innovative outcomes of firms (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). In this chapter I
propose two complementary mechanisms that may drive this effect.
First, investors may also foster the innovative outcomes of firms by increasing the
general efficiency of the firm, freeing resources and attention that can be focused on the
innovative outcomes. High technology entrepreneurial firms are often founded by
scientists that have little managerial experience; as a result, some of the decisions made
in the firm are not very efficient, take time, and diminish the span of attention that can be
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paid to the discovery process. For instance, a venture capitalist explained in an interview
that one of the most relevant contributions to their portfolio firms was the selection of a
competent CFO that knew how to manage the complex cash flows of a biotech firm. 14
Overall, shifting attention from management problems to scientific problems should
increase the research productivity.
Second, investors influence the technological trajectory of the firm. While the
high technology firm is an expert in its area of expertise, investors have a better
knowledge of the landscape of different innovations. Note that venture capitalists receive
hundreds of business plans per year, and they thrive in a difficult business, learning to
identify which opportunities have more commercial application. As such, once they
invest in a firm, they usually provide some direction in terms of what lines of research
have greater potential. In an interview, the founder and CEO of a biotechnology firm
acknowledged that the most helpful advice they had received from their investors was
precisely what research lines to follow and which ones not to. 15 Focusing the
technological trajectory on more commercial applications makes filing the patent more
attractive to the firm, and as a result increases the innovative outputs.
Therefore, all these mechanisms complement each other and suggest that
experienced investors enhance the innovative outcomes of firms. While I cannot
disentangle the processes empirically, I propose a positive effect of investors’ experience
on the innovative outcomes of firms.

14
15

Interview with a venture capitalist, Philadelphia (PA), April 2008.
Interview with the founder and CEO of a Spanish biotech firm, Madrid, December 2006.
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Hypothesis 3-1. The number of innovative outcomes of a firm increases with the
experience of the venture capital firms in the investment syndicate.
Even though the four aforementioned mechanisms (i.e. access to capital,
selection, increased efficiency, or focused technological trajectory) may all foster the
innovative outcomes of a firm, they may have a different effect depending on the type of
innovative outcome. Research has studied the trade-offs between applied and basic
science, finding that patents and publications are substitutes and at the same time
complements to some degree. In certain occasions basic and applied science complement
each other and leading to patent-publication pairs that are based on the same discovery
(Huang & Murray, 2009). However, they are substitutes to some extent, because some
basic science does not directly lead to a commercial application, and they both compete
for the resources devoted to research (Cockburn et al., 2002). Since applied science can
be monetized, investors may have incentives to foster patents in detriment of the
publications at times, and we may observe different effects. Even though it is not the
focus of this chapter to analyze the trade-offs between these two innovative outcomes, I
will analyze the effects separately in the results section to establish the baseline.
Regulatory Uncertainty as a Moderator of Experience
Even though experienced investors foster both the applied science and basic
science outcomes of firms, this effect is not independent of the institutional environment
in which the firm thrives. Resource-dependence theory predicts that in situations of
uncertainty firms depend more on external resources that are controlled by few firms, and
securing access to those resources enhances performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
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Therefore, one would expect that investors may have a more relevant resource provision
role in environments that are more uncertain.
High technology firms are subject to different sources of uncertainty. The
literature has discussed the technological and market uncertainty derived from the
discovery process and whether the innovation will have a commercial application.
Besides these two types of uncertainty, which are technology/product specific, the
institutional environment of the country presents “institutional uncertainty” as well which
greatly affects the operations of a firm. In particular, the regulation of intellectual
property rights has received much attention from research studies, which have analyzed
how firms locate depending on the levels of IP protection (Zhao, 2006). In particular,
when there is more political and regulatory uncertainty, firms tend to reduce the
investment in intangible resources, such as innovation. However, firms that know how to
manage that uncertainty sometimes choose to invest more in intangibles and extract then
rents (Henisz, 2000).
For high technology entrepreneurs that face an increased political or regulatory
hazard, having access to the experience of investors in dealing with these situations may
be critical to allow them to continue their investment in innovation. Hence, I expect:
Hypothesis 3-2. The effect of the experience of the venture capital firms on the
innovative outcomes of a firm is greater when the firm faces increased political and
regulatory hazard.
Nevertheless, not all innovative outcomes are equally affected by the regulatory
hazards of a country. While patents are highly regulated and usually take a long period of
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time to be granted, publications are only constrained by the regulations of intellectual
property protection regarding the accompanying patent. Hence, the uncertainty posed by
changes of the regulatory environment is much less. Therefore, I expect the previous
hypotheses to hold only for applied science outcomes and not necessarily for basic
science.

Methodology
Research Setting and Sample
I test the hypotheses in an international sample of biotechnology ventures. Being
high technology firms they have a focus on innovation, and there is a measurable output
for the innovation process (Darby & Zucker, 2002). Having an international sample
provides variation across different institutional environments to test how the effects
change across countries. Finally, entrepreneurial firms are subject to uncertainty, and as a
result investors may have more incentives to provide resources other than monetary to
increase the chances of success of the firm.
The departing point for data collection was the VentureXpert’s SDC Platinum
Database. This database comprises the investment history of firms that receive funding
from venture capital firms, financial institutions, institutional investors, government
sponsored institutions or strategic partners, and it is the investment database with greater
international coverage. It has been widely used in both the entrepreneurship (Megginson
& Weiss, 1991; Sahlman, 1990; Shane & Stuart, 2002) and the multinational literatures
(Guler & Guillen, 2010a; Guler & McGahan, 2006, 2007). To complement the data
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provided in VentureXpert, I built the history of each of the firms in the sample using the
company website (when available) and Factiva Dow Jones; this allowed me to keep track
of all the name changes of the firm, as well as to ascertain if and when the firm was
acquired or merged, went public, or went bankrupt.
To collect the innovative outcomes of these firms, I gathered publications using
ISI Web of Knowledge and patents using the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website.
In an interview, a patent lawyer explained that using only U.S. patents is not restrictive in
the case of biotechnology firms, because they need to patent in a variety of countries
simultaneously to ensure the protection of their invention. 16 In a research study, Graham
et al (2002) found that U.S. patents tend to find less opposition than in Europe, and so it
is a less restrictive measure.
The sample consists of 631 biotechnology entrepreneurs founded between 1991
and 2002 in 30 different countries, with a total of 2,354 venture-years (i.e. unit of
analysis). I collected all the biotechnology entrepreneurs from outside the U.S. and a 10%
random sample of the American firms. While ideally one would want to have all the U.S.
firms, the process of obtaining all the data was time consuming and I chose to maximize
the institutional variation (i.e. the country variation) for theoretical reasons. Firms were
followed until they go bankrupt, until they are acquired, until they go public –since at this
point they are not regarded as entrepreneurial firms; or until 2002.17 As a result, the
sample is entrepreneurial by nature, as these are high-technology, private ventures, with

16

Interview with a patent lawyer, Philadelphia (PA), September 2007.
The window of observation is 2005, but I restrict the analysis to 2002 to ensure the observability of the
patents, as explained below.
17
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an average age of 3 years, and with most of the mass between 0 and 6 years of existence,
within the usual criteria (Autio et al., 2000).
Although it would be appealing to study the variation across different types of
investors, they differ greatly in their degree of involvement, the type of resources shared,
and the time allocated to each investment. To avoid this noise, I choose to focus on
venture capital firms, building on a vast literature that documents how they tend to share
their expertise, resources, and networks with their portfolio firms (Gompers & Lerner,
2004; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). To gain a better understanding of the processes
underlying the motivations of venture capitalists, I conducted informal interviews with
venture capital firms and biotechnology firms.
Dependent Variables
The four dependent variables in the study are publications, patents, patent
forward citations, and patent non-self citations. The Publications of the firm were hand
collected from the ISI Web of Knowledge, identifying those publications whose authors
were affiliated to the biotechnology firm. To ensure the consistency in the coding, the
whole process was done by one research assistant, and a 5% random sample was
rechecked by a second research assistant. While the results of both coding outputs were
remarkably similar (99% coincidence), there were some inconsistencies in companies
with more than 50 publications, so I coded these again to ensure accuracy.
The variables Patents, ForwardCitations and Non-Self-Citations were obtained
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. These were hand collected to ensure that the
assignee is the same firm that is included in the sample (i.e. by checking the address, as
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well as the identity of the inventors when necessary). In consonance with the patent
literature, I considered only those patents that were granted, using the application date.
Since all patents were re-collected in early 2009, this greatly reduces the concern of the
patent grant lag and ensures that most patents were observed. In unreported analyses, I
studied the lag between filing and publication dates in my sample, finding that the vast
majority of patents had a lag inferior to six years. Therefore, I restrict the window of
observation of the analysis to the period 1990 to 2002, thereby reducing the concerns
related to the lag.
Note that because some of the firms were acquired, the patent reassignment rule
poses a concern on the observability of the firm’s patents. By regulation 35 U.S.C. 261,
patent applications and patents may be reassigned to the new owners in case of an
acquisition. Hence, for the 66 firms that were acquired in my sample there is a concern
with the observability of the patent measures. In robustness analyses I excluded all the
firms that are acquired, finding similar qualitative and quantitative results.
The Patentsit variable measures the flow of (granted) patents of the
biotechnology firm i filed in time t, regardless of the technology class. 18 The patents are
assigned to firm i when it appears in the Assignee field of the patent, and while most of
them are dated after the founding of the firm, there are some patents that date prior to the
founding. Robustness analyses were done excluding these patents. Some of the patents
were filed using the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), and so for these the date of filing

18

Since biotechnology is an interdisciplinary field, I did not restrict to patents within the biotechnology
class, since patents in other areas are also indicative of the innovative activities of the firm.
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in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may be posterior to the initial filing date. In
these cases, I chose the date of first filing (i.e. PCT filing date).
The ForwardCitationsit variable measures the flow of patents filed in time t that
cite any of the patents of firm i. This measure is generally preferred to the count of
patents, since it is considered more related to the real innovative outcomes and less
subject to variations for legal and strategic issues (e.g. Cockburn et al., 2002). The
measure NonSelfCitationsit is a variation of the previous measure, which excludes all
forward citations such that the focal firm is the (or one of the) assignees of the patent.
Finally, the Publicationsit variable is operationalized as the flow of publications
of firm i in time t. Likewise patents, some of the publications pre-date the incorporation
date; sensitivity analyses were conducted excluding these publications
Analyses
Since the dependent variables only take positive integer values, it is recommended
to use a count model. The simplest alternative is to use a Poisson or a negative binomial,
which is a transformation of the Poisson model that relaxes the assumption of having a
mean equal to the standard deviation. Unfortunately, when introducing firm fixed effects
the estimation is not robust and it is not recommended (Allison, 2005; Wooldridge,
1997). Instead, I used the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, which unlike the
Poisson maximum likelihood estimator, does not assume that the distribution has a
variance equal to the mean, and is robust when using firm fixed effects. To implement
this in Stata I use the xtqmlp command, originally developed by Tim Simcoe ( available
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for download at http://pazoulay.scripts.mit.edu/Software.html) (Cameron & Trivedi,
2009).
Using firm fixed effects partially reduces the concerns of endogenous matching
between investors with experience and promising biotech entrepreneurs. Research has
shown that there is a non-random matching between investors and entrepreneurs (Hsu,
2004; Sørensen, 2007); the dynamics of such matching, however, are complex, and while
the general concern is that the best entrepreneurs are matched with the best investors, this
need not be the case (Amit et al., 1991). To the extent that the matching is based on a
fixed characteristic of the firm, for instance, characteristics of the founding team, country
where the venture is located, or whether the firm is a spin-off, then firm fixed effects
address the endogenous matching. Nevertheless, one could argue that at some point in
time very seasoned investors may anticipate a change in direction in the firm’s innovative
outcomes, and then invest in the firm to reap the benefits. For instance, a biotech
entrepreneur that just hired a star scientist is likely to increase the number of patents in
the future, and while the investor can observe this, it may remain an unobserved factor
for the researcher. As a result, causality has to be argued with caution in this respect and
it will be discussed below for each of the hypotheses the direction of both the predicted
and the selection mechanisms in order to draw conclusions.
Independent Variables
Investor characteristics
The core thesis of the chapter refers to the effect of investor experience on the
innovative outcomes of firms. For each biotech year, I measured ExperienceVCi,t-1 as the
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total number of IPOs the venture capital firms in the syndicate have experienced in the
past (up to t-1); for parsimony, I operationalize the experience regardless of the industry.
Because this is the measure used in other chapters in this dissertation, it facilitates the
comparison of the results. In robustness analyses I find similar qualitative results when
measuring the experience as the number of past investments, instead of just those that
went public, and when restricting the experience to only biotechnology firms.
Besides the experience I included other variables that describe the syndicate of
investors, such as: a) Round of investment i,t-1, which takes values 0, 1, 2… indicating the
number of round of investment; b) VCi,t-1, an indicator of whether there is a venture
capital firm in the syndicate; c) Financial Institution i,t-1, an indicator of whether there is a
financial institution in the syndicate; and d) CVC i,t-1, an indicator of whether there is a
corporate venture capital firm in the syndicate.
Stock of innovative outcomes and other firm variables
PatentStock i,t-1 measures the number of patents assigned to firm i up to t-1. As in
the dependent variable, I used the filing date (and the PCT filing date when available),
but instead of the flow this variable measures the stock. In robustness analyses I broke
this variable into the flow of patents in t-1 (i.e. lagged dependent variable) and the stock
up to t-2, with similar results.
PublicationStock i,t-1 measures the number of publications of authors affiliated to
firm i, with publication date up to t-1. Results are robust to using the flow of publications
in t-1 (i.e. lagged dependent variable) and the stock of publications up to t-2.
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Finally, I also included the Firm’s Age i,t-1 of the firm since the date of
incorporation as well as the square term (Firm’s Age squared i,t-1), since the number of
patents, publications and citations may increase with age, but at a decreasing rate. For
those patents and publications filed/published before the date of incorporation, the age is
zero. In robustness analyses, I excluded all the observations prior to founding, with
similar qualitative and quantitative results, as described in the results section.
Biotech’s country of origin characteristics
I measure the hazard of expropriation using the political constraints index
(Polcon) developed by Henisz (2002), which estimates the feasibility of a policy change
by taking into account the checks and balances among political actors. I define the
variable Expropriation Hazardit as the Polcon index with reversed sign, for consistency
with the previous chapter.
To account for the cross-country institutional variation, I build on Guler and
Guillen (2010b) and control for the level of economic development, as the GDP per
capita (PPP), and for the stock exchange market capitalization, as percentage of the GDP,
and the stock exchange turnover, all from the World Bank.

Results
Table 3-1 shows the distribution by country of the whole sample and sub-samples
used in the analyses. The original sample spans a total of 30 countries, with Germany,
U.S., U.K., Canada, Korea and France being the more frequent, consistent with the
distribution from the industry. Because all the analyses in this chapter are fixed effects
models, they only use in the estimation those firms for which there is within-firm
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variation. While this is always the case in fixed effects models, it is useful to understand
how the subsamples of firms that vary differ from the original sample. The remaining
four columns of table 3-1 show the number of venture-years per country finally used in
the estimation of the patents, publications, patent citations, and patent non-self citations
models. Note that while the original sample has 30 countries, the final estimation
comprises 23 countries for patents, 21 for publications, 18 for patent citations and 17 for
non self citations. While this is a very reasonable number of countries for an international
sample, it restricts the range of institutional variation, making the moderating effect of
institutional variation variables (such as Expropriation Hazard) more difficult to observe,
for which this is a more conservative test.
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Table 3-1. Dependent Variables, Distribution by Country
Non Self
Sample:a
Whole
Patents Publications
Citations
Citations
Country
N
N
N
N
N
Australia
69
35
23
20
11
Austria
12
4
4
0
0
Belgium
23
10
15
10
10
Brazil
18
0
0
0
0
Canada
160
105
87
82
69
China
9
0
0
0
0
Denmark
48
20
24
17
17
Finland
67
49
39
16
9
France
172
80
102
54
54
Germany
503
208
311
100
100
Hungary
10
10
10
10
10
India
44
6
9
0
0
Ireland
24
9
11
2
2
Israel
85
58
43
28
28
Italy
2
0
0
0
0
Japan
20
14
6
0
0
Korea
177
46
80
19
19
Malaysia
1
0
0
0
0
Netherlands
26
12
22
8
8
New Zealand
10
10
0
10
0
Norway
40
23
20
12
7
Portugal
6
6
0
0
0
Singapore
1
0
0
0
0
South Africa
3
0
0
0
0
Spain
14
0
6
0
0
Sweden
82
65
42
61
52
Switzerland
40
31
31
15
9
Turkey
3
0
0
0
0
U.K.
225
119
130
82
59
b
U.S.A.
239
167
168
132
125
Total
2,133
1,087
1,183
678
589
a
The patents, publications, citations, and non self citations samples include those firms
included in the within firm estimation, i.e. those firms for which there is variation in the
corresponding dependent variable.
b
Note that for the U.S. I have a random sample of 10% of the biotech firms, while I collected
the population (as per VentureXpert) for all the other countries.

73
Table 3-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the sample, as well
as the descriptive statistics for the patents, patent citations and publications subsamples. It
is worth noting that on average the whole experience of the VC firms in the syndicate
amounts to 134 previous investments, but the right tail of the distribution is more than
4,000 deals. Robustness analyses were conducted to ensure the results were not driven by
this right tail. Regarding the innovative outcomes, firms in the sample have on average
1.26 patents, 0.5 citations and 2.8 publications. The sample is entrepreneurial by nature,
being observed since founding until six years, on average. When analyzing differences of
the citations and publications sub-samples it is important to note that these firms tend to
have investors with greater experience, and they tend to have more patents, publications
and citations. Naturally, those that don’t have patents, publications or citations don’t
experience change in the dependent variable and tend to be less attractive to investors.
Table 3-3 shows the correlation for the whole sample. Consistent with previous
literature, the correlation between publications and patents is positive and significant.
However, while the stock of publications and the stock of patents have a positive
correlation, this is much lower (0.10). This is consistent with the dual nature of patents
and publication as complements but also as substitutes (Cockburn et al., 2002; Huang &
Murray, 2009). As expected, citations and patents are correlated. Finally, the correlations
between the experience variables and the interactions of experience and expropriation
hazard are high; in robustness analyses I centered the variables, finding similar results.
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Table 3-2. Descriptive Statistics
Sample:a
Variables

Whole
avg
s.e.

Patents
avg
s.e.

Patents i,t-1

0.46

1.24

0.89

1.61

0.64

1.52

1.10

1.90

Publications i,t-1

1.06

3.09

1.39

3.39

1.86

3.92

1.43

3.67

Citations i,t-1

0.83

4.16

1.58

5.69

1.10

3.99

2.58

7.02

0.65

3.76

1.23

5.16

0.83

3.36

2.03

6.41

0.10

0.35

0.15

0.43

0.15

0.43

0.17

0.47

0.45

1.64

0.70

2.02

0.69

2.05

0.76

2.26

-0.04

0.14

-0.06

0.18

-0.06

0.18

-0.07

0.19

1.26

3.00

2.28

3.88

1.74

3.73

3.19

4.56

PublicationStock i,t-1

0.03

0.16

0.03

0.17

0.05

0.21

0.04

0.22

Firm’s Age i,t-1

3.24

2.47

3.62

2.54

3.43

2.43

3.75

2.64

Firm’s Age squared i,t-1

16.60

24.50

19.57

25.59

17.63

23.76

21.01

26.46

Round of investment i,t-1

0.73

1.04

0.94

1.26

0.94

1.17

1.02

1.40

VCi,t-1

0.37

0.48

0.43

0.50

0.47

0.50

0.44

0.50

Financial Institution i,t-1

0.15

0.35

0.18

0.38

0.17

0.37

0.17

0.37

CVC i,t-1

0.02

0.15

0.03

0.17

0.03

0.17

0.04

0.19

28.12

7.26

29.29

5.85

29.22

5.97

29.85

5.49

4.33

0.65

4.44

0.64

4.39

0.64

4.49

0.62

4.47

0.59

4.40

0.54

4.50

0.57

4.39

0.52

-0.45

0.08

-0.45

0.07

-0.45

0.07

-0.45

0.08

Non Self Citations i,t-1
b

ExperienceVCi,t-1
Experience VCi,t-1
* Turnover i,t-1 b,c
Experience VCi,t-1 b
* Expropriationi,t-1b
PatentStock i,t-1
b

GDP i,t-1
StockMarketCap i,t-1
Turnover i,t-1

c

Expropriation i,t-1

c

Publications
avg
s.e.

Citations
avg
s.e.

N (venture years)
2,255
1,161
1,266
726
N (number of firms)
607
246
287
143
a
Fixed effects models (within estimation) only use firms for which the dependent variable
changes. This table presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, and for the subsamples used in the estimation of the patents, publications, and citations regressions.
b
Experience VC and PublicationStock measures are divided by 100 for table readability; hence,
the unit is 100 IPOs and a 100 publications respectively.
c
Logarithmic transformation of Stock Market Capitalization and Turnover (plus 1, since the
minimum value is zero) throughout tables.
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Table 3-3. Correlations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Patents i,t-1
Publications i,t-1
Citations i,t-1
Non Self Citations i,t-1
ExperienceVCi,t-1b
Experience VCi,t-1
* Turnover i,t-1 b,c
Experience VCi,t-1 b
* Expropriationi,t-1b
PatentStock i,t-1
PublicationStock i,t-1b
Firm’s Age i,t-1
Firm’s Age squared i,t-1
Round of investment i,t-1
VCi,t-1
Financial Institution i,t-1
CVC i,t-1
GDP i,t-1
StockMarketCap i,t-1 c
Turnover i,t-1c
Expropriation i,t-1

1

2

3

4

5

.29
.41
.32
.31

.14
.13
.29

.97
.19

.18

.30

.28

.19

.18

.99

-.3
.5
.13
.08
.04
.22
.14
.09
.05
.10
.11
-.05
.05
10

-.29
.22
.70
.06
.03
.23
.21
.09
.05
.03
.01
-.05
.06
11

-.19
.57
.06
.16
.13
.25
.16
.12
.07
.12
.11
.02
.03
12

-.17
.52
.06
.15
.13
.23
.14
.11
.06
.11
.09
.02
.02
13

-.99
.27
.08
.14
.10
.54
.37
.15
.07
.19
.16
.05
.13
14

6

7

8

-.98
.27
.08
.14
.10
.54
.36
.15
.06
.20
.17
.08
.13
15

-.28
-.08
-.14
-.10
-.54
-.37
-.16
-.09
-.19
-.15
-.04
-.08
16

.10
.30
.27
.39
.23
.17
.11
.16
.17
-.02
.06
17

9

.04
.04
.10
.12
.02
.01
-.07
-.06
-.07
.05
18

10. Firm’s Age i,t-1
.95
11. Firm’s Age squared i,t-1
.34 .26
12. Round of investment i,t-1
.24 .17 .67
13. VCi,t-1
.15 .10 .42 .25
14. Financial Institution i,t-1
.08 .07 .18 .15 .11
15. CVC i,t-1
GDP
.05 .03 .25 .21 .07 .07
16.
i,t-1
c
.06 .05 .20 .14 .06 .05 .51
17. StockMarketCap i,t-1
.02 .02 .16 .12 .02 -.04 .08 -.10
18. Turnover i,t-1c
.02 .01 .13 .09 -.02 -.05 .05 .17 .28
19. Expropriation i,t-1
a
N (venture-years) = 2,133, number of firms = 607. All correlations larger than 0.04 are
significant at p < 0.05.
b
Experience VC and PublicationStock measures are divided by 100 for table readability;
hence, the unit is 100 IPOs and a 100 publications respectively.
c
Logarithmic transformation of Stock Market Capitalization and Turnover (plus 1, since
the minimum value is zero) throughout tables.
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The results from the Poisson quasi-likelihood regressions are shown in table 3-4.
For each of the four dependent variables, patents, publications, patent forward citations,
and patent non-self citations, I estimate the effect of the ExperienceVC variable, and the
interaction with the Expropriation Hazard variable. Additionally I estimate a full model
that includes the interaction with the Turnover variable, so that the results can be
compared throughout the chapters of the dissertation.
Interestingly, the stock of patents in year t-1 (PatentStocki,t-1) reduces the count of
patents, and the stock of publications (PublicationStocki,t-1) reduces the flow of
publications. Using different lags of this variable I found the same effect. This negative
effect may be just the result of cycles in the research and development within the firm.
Since these are relatively young and small biotechnology firms, applying for a patent is a
major milestone, and there may be on average some lag until the firm is prepared to apply
for the following. However, more research may be needed to understand these dynamics.
It is also worth noting that the publication stock increases the count of patents of a firm,
which suggests that basic science and applied science may act as complements. Since
publications are basic science they are less affected by prior applied knowledge, and so I
find no effect of the stock of patents on the count of publications. These two results may
indicate the presence of patent-publication pairs. In fact, a closer look at a small sample
of the firms in my sample revealed the existence of some pairs, although for a great
proportion of the patents there was not a clear match between patents and publications. In
unreported regressions I controlled for the interaction between the patent stock and the
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publication stock; while the main results did not change, this interaction was significant
for some models.
The first hypothesis of this chapter is that the Experience of the VC enhances the
innovative outcomes of the firm. I test this in the first model for each of the dependent
variables (I), finding that the effect is positive and significant for Publications, Patent
Citations and NonSelfCitations. However, the effect was not significant for Patents. One
possible explanation may be the nature of the variable, which increases not just due to
innovation but also when the firm builds a patent thicket. Because of this reason, patent
forward citations are usually considered a better measure of the innovative processes of
the firm. The second hypothesis postulates that the effect of the experience of the
investors will be accentuated when the hazard of Expropriation increases. Models II test
this effect, finding support for the hypotheses for patents, patent citations and non-selfcitations. As expected, the effect is not significant for publications, which are generally
less affected by the regulatory regime. Note that while the main effect of Expropriation
Hazard is positive and significant (for the citations and non-self citations models), this
main effect is reduced and not significant when the interaction is controlled for. Note that
this is within-firm estimation, and so the lack of the main effect simply implies that the
changes in the Expropriation Hazard of the local country across time does not directly
affect the outcome, but rather moderate the impact of investor experience.
Finally, and as a comparison to the results of the previous chapter, I test the
interaction of the experience of the investors with the stock exchange Turnover. Overall,
the main effect of Experience loses strength and significance in this model, but the
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interaction with the Expropriation Hazard is more robust. The interaction with Turnover
is positive and significant for the citations and non-self citations models. Nevertheless,
the correlation among these two interactions is extremely high; centering the variables
did not improve the collinearity problem.
The results are generally robust to different specifications. Because of the
multicollinearity problem with some of the variables, I repeated the analyses centering
the Expropriation and Turnover variables, with the same qualitative results. Other
robustness analyses included different specifications of the patents and publications stock
measures, with different lags, which did not alter the main results. Measuring experience
as the number of past deals instead of the number of IPOs did not change the findings of
the paper either. To address the potential concerns with patent reassignments after an
acquisition, I excluded all the firms that were acquired; while the results are generally the
same, the significance level for the second hypothesis in the patents regression is only
10%. Similarly, the strength of hypothesis 2 drops when I exclude the patents prior to the
founding. Overall, this may indicate the presence of noise in the Patents variable.
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Table 3-4. Results of the QMLE Poisson on Patents and Publications
Dependent Variablea
ExperienceVCi,t-1b
Experience VCi,t-1
* Expropriationi,t-1b
Experience VCi,t-1
* Turnover i,t-1 b,c

Patents
(I)
0.36†
(0.20)

b

PatentStock i,t-1
PublicationStock i,t-1b
Firm’s Age i,t-1
Firm’s Age squared i,t-1
Round of investment i,t-1
VCi,t-1
Financial Institution i,t-1
CVC i,t-1
GDP i,t-1
StockMarketCap i,t-1 c
Turnover i,t-1c
Expropriation i,t-1
Firm Fixed Effects

-0.10***
(0.02)
4.08***
(0.91)
0.38***
(0.10)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.21*
(0.10)
0.09
(0.15)
0.48**
(0.16)
-0.01
(0.28)
0.14
(0.09)
0.11
(0.22)
-0.12
(0.18)
1.47
(1.89)
Yes

(II)
1.77*
(0.74)

(III)
1.53
(1.13)

Publications
(I)
(II)
0.51**
-0.64
(0.18)
(0.72)

3.39*
(1.70)

3.32†
(1.73)

-2.80†
(1.62)

-2.76
(1.70)

-0.10***
(0.02)
4.06***
(0.91)
0.38***
(0.10)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.21*
(0.10)
0.10
(0.15)
0.50**
(0.15)
0.04
(0.28)
0.13
(0.09)
0.12
(0.22)
-0.12
(0.18)
0.29
(1.71)
Yes

0.05
(0.17)
-0.10***
(0.02)
4.04***
(0.90)
0.38***
(0.10)
-0.03***
(0.01)
-0.21*
(0.10)
0.10
(0.14)
0.50**
(0.15)
0.05
(0.28)
0.13
(0.09)
0.12
(0.22)
-0.13
(0.19)
0.30
(1.70)
Yes

0.00
(0.01)
-1.78***
(0.31)
0.54***
(0.14)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.09
(0.12)
0.06
(0.15)
-0.02
(0.14)
-0.06
(0.29)
0.21
(0.15)
0.22†
(0.12)
0.25*
(0.10)
1.24
(1.34)
Yes

-0.02
(0.13)
0.00
(0.01)
-1.78***
(0.31)
0.54***
(0.14)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.09
(0.12)
0.06
(0.15)
-0.02
(0.14)
-0.06
(0.29)
0.22
(0.15)
0.22†
(0.12)
0.25*
(0.10)
1.25
(1.35)
Yes

0.00
(0.01)
-1.78***
(0.32)
0.55***
(0.14)
-0.04***
(0.01)
-0.08
(0.11)
0.04
(0.15)
-0.01
(0.14)
0.01
(0.28)
0.20
(0.14)
0.24*
(0.12)
0.24*
(0.11)
0.04
(1.30)
Yes

(III)
-0.54
(1.15)

(continues)

80
(continued…)

Dependent Variablea
ExperienceVCi,t-1b
Experience VCi,t-1
* Expropriationi,t-1b
Experience VCi,t-1
* Turnover i,t-1 b,c

b

Citations
(I)
0.64**
(0.23)

(II)
(III)
3.72*** 1.28
(1.08)
(1.51)
7.42**
(2.50)

6.97**
(2.44)

Non self citations
(I)
(II)
0.78**
3.82**
(0.24)
(1.24)
7.26*
(3.01)

(III)
1.77
(1.52)
6.88*
(2.97)

0.45*
0.38*
(0.22)
(0.19)
PatentStock i,t-1
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
0.04+
0.04*
0.04*
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
PublicationStock i,t-1b
1.08
0.95
0.81
-1.70*
-1.91**
-2.01**
(0.74)
(0.74)
(0.69)
(0.74)
(0.73)
(0.69)
Firm’s Age i,t-1
1.14*** 1.14*** 1.20*** 1.05***
1.06*** 1.11***
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
Firm’s Age squared i,t-1
-0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Round of investment i,t-1 -0.33*
-0.35*
-0.40**
-0.26
-0.28
-0.33+
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.18)
VCi,t-1
0.26
0.25
0.29
0.22
0.21
0.24
(0.18)
(0.18)
(0.18)
(0.21)
(0.21)
(0.21)
Financial Institution i,t-1
0.31
0.40+
0.43*
0.03
0.13
0.15
(0.22)
(0.21)
(0.21)
(0.29)
(0.28)
(0.28)
CVC i,t-1
-0.70**
-0.63*
-0.56*
-0.60
-0.55
-0.49
(0.27)
(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.38)
(0.37)
(0.36)
GDP i,t-1
-0.14
-0.16
-0.17
-0.25*
-0.28*
-0.28*
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.11)
StockMarketCap i,t-1 c
0.87**
0.84**
0.88**
1.03**
1.03**
1.05**
(0.29)
(0.30)
(0.30)
(0.33)
(0.33)
(0.33)
Turnover i,t-1c
0.25
0.23
0.14
0.16
0.13
0.05
(0.27)
(0.27)
(0.28)
(0.28)
(0.29)
(0.30)
Expropriation i,t-1
5.69*
1.49
1.59
4.77*
0.95
1.04
(2.30)
(2.82)
(2.72)
(2.27)
(3.20)
(3.09)
Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
a
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n=1264 (venture-years), groups=288 (ventures)
b
The Experience variables, Stock Market Capitalization and Turnover were divided by 100,
and GDP by 1000. For interpretation, the coefficient should be divided by 100 (or 1000).
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter sought to answer the question of where the innovative outcomes of
firms are affected by their investors. While there is little doubt that investors pick winners
and that their monetary contribution are critical to the research and development activities
of firms, it is less clear whether they have an impact above and beyond that. Evidence at
the industry level, however, seems to indicate they do (Kortum & Lerner, 2000). This
chapter proposed that investors may increase the general efficiency of the firm, hence
allowing more attention to be paid to the research activities, and that they provide firms
with a better mapping of the industry and help them focus their research activities in
areas with greater potential for commercialization. In fact, I find that more experienced
investors increase both the patents and the publications of the firm, evidence which is
consistent with these mechanisms even though they cannot be fully identified.
While investors may foster the innovative outcomes, they have a different impact
depending on the uncertainty of the environment. I find that in situations with higher
political and regulatory uncertainty investors have a higher impact on the research
productivity of the firm. This observation is consistent with resource-dependence theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978): as entrepreneurial firms face higher uncertainty, investors can
make a higher contribution to the performance of the firm. Hence, this chapter speaks to
the resource-dependence literature by linking it to the innovative processes, rather than
just financial outcomes. In addition, I provide a broader context to understand the macrofoundations of the strategy of firms, and how the firm’s strategy and its outcomes depend
on the environments in which they operate. Even though investors may foster all types of
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innovative outcomes, the impact varies for basic and applied science, and while the
impact on patents depends on the regulatory environment, the impact on publications
does not. This finding speaks to the stream of literature that has analyzed the differences
across these two outcomes.
The main limitation of this chapter is that it cannot identify the processes by
which investors foster the different innovative outcomes. Therefore, it remains an open
question for future research to identify which mechanisms are driving the results.
Another limitation of this research is that it is limited to the biotechnology industry. Even
though the industry has attractive features for this study (i.e. measurable innovative
output, global industry), it is a peculiar one. Therefore, the extent to which results are
generalizable to other industries is a concern.
The findings of this chapter have implications for practice. Previous literature has
suggested that firms should pay attention to who their investors are because their
reputation and resources may impact firm performance. This chapter complements this
finding by suggesting that investors may also impact the innovative processes of the firm,
and so this may have a longer term impact on firm performance. The implication for
investors is that their expertise may help foster the innovation of the firm, but the value of
the experience depends also of the macro-conditions of the firm. And in particular,
different types of experience may be more or less valuable depending on these
conditions.

83

4. Investors’ Know-How or Investors’ “Know-Whom”?
Introduction
Thus far this dissertation has studied where experienced investors contribute to
the performance and innovative outcomes of firms, setting aside the question of what
drives this effect. Past research has shown evidence of a reputation endorsement by
investors (Hochberg et al., 2007; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). In
addition, investors take advantage of their managerial capabilities and knowledge of the
industry to act as consultants to their portfolio firms (Amit et al., 1998; Gorman &
Sahlman, 1989). This chapter asks the question of where these two mechanisms, social
capital and experience, are more important for the performance of the firms.
Decades of research by interorganizational network theorists have demonstrated
that the network of relationships of a firm and the relational assets that are derived from
such network have an impact on firm’s performance (e.g. Burt, 1992; Nahapiet &
Ghoshal, 1998). In addition, strategy scholars on the relational view of the firm have
argued that firms may obtain relational rents from their network of contacts by combining
the resources that each of them owns (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). As firms gain
experience, they build their networks of contacts and as a result, acquire social capital.
Hence, reputation endorsement I is one of the mechanisms by which experience impacts
performance.
There is evidence that firms benefit from the social capital of their close
relationships, and in particular, they benefit from the social capital of their investors.
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Stuart et al (1999) found that startups with more prominent partners survive longer and
are more likely to go public. The rationale is that prominent investors reduce the problem
of information asymmetries that third parties confront. In fact, third parties lack
information about the quality and trustworthiness of the startup; when this startup is
endorsed by a reputable partner, then the risk of the startup is reduced (Amit et al., 1998).
This is what the finance literature has called the “certification effect” of investors
(Megginson & Weiss, 1991). Sociologists name this problem the altercentric uncertainty,
or the uncertainty about the quality and reputation that third parties have, in contrast to
the egocentric uncertainty, which is the uncertainty that the focal firm has about its own
position.
Nevertheless, social capital is a complex construct. Network theorists have argued
that there are two different sets of relationships that enhance the social capital of a firm.
Firms whose position in the network is very central and dense benefit from prominence
and reputation, while firms whose position connects firms otherwise unconnected benefit
from richer access to information (Burt, 1992). Podolny (2001) argued that while a
central position that signals quality is better suited to deal with altercentric uncertainty, a
position in a structural hole that allows the firm to benefit from richer information is
better suited to deal with egocentric uncertainty. Hence, while central positions act as
prisms, structural holes are the pipes of the network. In this chapter I build on this
distinction and analyze how different network positions may have different effects on the
performance of firms depending on the type of uncertainty.
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Hence, a brokerage position that provides ties to a more diverse set of actors
reduces uncertainty by providing richer information and increasing familiarity, while
status reduces uncertainty by signaling quality. As a result, the value of these positions is
not constant across different environments and times. Jensen (2003) found that both the
presence of market ties and the status of firms conferred and advantage to enter a new
market; however, the value of status decreases over time and is less important to
experienced customers. Guler and Guillen (2010a) found that the social status of firms is
more easily transferred across countries; the brokerage advantage, however, derives from
a richer information and connections and cannot be so easily transferred to a different
country. This chapter seeks to extend this argument by analyzing how these two
advantages vary across institutional environments.
Finally, social capital, as the “network and the assets that may be mobilized
through that network” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998:1998), comprises a set of resources of
investors that explain their impact on performance. However, past research has shown
that there are other investors’ resources that may provide the firm with an advantage
(Hochberg et al., 2007). For instance, their knowhow about how to conduct interviews,
their managerial capabilities and knowledge of best practices may help them
professionalize the firms (Hellmann & Puri, 2002); their knowledge of the market, helps
them time the public offerings better (Lerner, 1994b). This chapter will compare the
effects of network structure and the remaining effect of experience across different
institutional environments.
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To measure the network of investors I build on previous literature (Lerner, 1994a;
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Stuart et al., 1999) and focus on the co-investment (i.e.
syndication) relationships among investors. These are by no means the only relevant
connections that an investor brings to the venture, since contacts to other portfolio firms
(Lindsey, 2002) or contacts with strategic partners may prove very useful. Yet, they are a
homogeneous set of relationships that is very relevant especially for helping the venture
advance through the different milestones towards an IPO or an acquisition.

Hypotheses Development
Investor Experience, Pipes, and Prisms
Past research has described two main mechanisms by which investors contribute
to the performance of their portfolio firms: reputation endorsements and value added. The
literature has argued that investors such as venture capital firms reduce the information
asymmetries that third parties face regarding new ventures; this is the certification or
reputation endorsement phenomenon (Amit et al., 1998; Megginson & Weiss, 1991;
Stuart et al., 1999). Scholars have also analyzed mechanisms that entail adding value to
the firm; for instance, venture capital firms professionalize the top management teams
and human resource policies (Hellmann & Puri, 2002), foster the formation of alliances
of their portfolio firms (Hsu, 2006), or provide strategic advice (Gorman & Sahlman,
1989). In essence, while the former depends more on the network of contacts of investors
(know-whom), the latter is rooted on the knowledge resources and capabilities of the firm
(knowhow).
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These two mechanisms are closely intertwined, partly because having experience
is an antecedent both to accumulating knowledge and to building relationships. Besides,
intangible resources and the network of contacts are intertwined, and at times it may be
difficult to ascribe a particular mechanism to one or the other category. Take for instance
the professionalization of a top management team by attracting key talent to the firm. The
capability to identify a talented manager and the knowhow of what abilities are required
in a certain position are certainly knowledge-based. However, a firm with more
connections will have a greater pool of managers to consider, and will be able to attract
their talent, both of which are network-based. Therefore, it may not be possible to
completely disentangle both mechanisms empirically. Despite the challenge in the
interpretation, there is value in distinguishing these two mechanisms because they shed
light on the processes behind the impact of investors on firm performance.
Therefore, the effect of investors’ experience is partly driven by the reputation
endorsement mechanism, but not entirely. Hence, I expect this effect to persist even after
controlling for the two network mechanisms. Hence:
Hypothesis 4-1: Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired, even after controlling for the network of
relationships.
Entrepreneurial firms are faced with different sources of uncertainty, including
whether the technology will succeed, the quality of the product, and how the market will
receive it. In addition to this egocentric uncertainty, they lack a reputation for quality or
trustworthiness. This increases the so called altercentric uncertainty or, in other words,
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creates information asymmetries to third parties; and in return, generates more
uncertainty regarding the success of the entrepreneurial ventures. The resources that a
firm obtains from its network of relationships may help attenuate these sources of
uncertainty.
The status of investors acts as a prism attenuating the altercentric uncertainty. The
reputation endorsement literature argues that investors with higher social capital, or
reputation, enhance the performance of their portfolio firms. Stuart et al (1999) show that
third parties rely on the prominence of the affiliates of entrepreneurial firms, such as
investors, and that this allows them to perform better than firms which lack prominent
associates. This certification or reduction in the information asymmetries is also proposed
by Megginson and Weiss (1991) as one of the reasons why venture-capital-backed firms
perform better. In their study of U.S. venture capital investments, Hochberg et al (2007)
demonstrate that venture capital firms with higher status perform better on average, and
that entrepreneurs backed with reputed venture capital firms survive longer. Therefore, I
predict the baseline effect of the reputation of the investors on the hazard of an IPO or an
acquisition to be positive. Since past research has found that the reputation of the
investors is in general transferable across borders (Guler & Guillen, 2010a), I measure
the reputation in the global network.
Hypothesis 4-2: Investors’ global reputation increases the chances of the venture
going public or being acquired.
Investors’ network ties, as the pipes that channel information and resources, may
position investors and their portfolio firms at an advantage. As a result of technological
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and market uncertainty, entrepreneurial firms face uncertainty of whether they will
succeed, that is, egocentric uncertainty. Investors with ties that can provide access to
different expertise and resources may alleviate this uncertainty. For instance, an investor
that has ties to investors in a foreign country may be in a better position to attract these
foreign investors, or may have more contacts to find a potential acquirer in a different
country, or even have the resources necessary to attempt a foreign public offering. Richer
network ties may also provide advantageous to foster commercial alliances for the
entrepreneurial firm.
In the case of investors, this brokerage advantage may be very specific to a region
or a country. Guler and Guillen (2010a) show that the brokerage advantage is not
transferrable to other countries and, as a result, investors with a high brokerage advantage
in their home country tend to stay. Another implication of this finding is that investors
with a brokerage position in a country where they are investing may achieve advantage.
Hence, I expect this brokerage advantage to have a positive effect on the performance of
the entrepreneurial firm. 19
Hypothesis 4-3: Investors’ brokerage position in the venture’s country increases
the chances of the venture going public or being acquired.
Heterogeneity across environments?
For entrepreneurs it may be desirable to partner with investors that have the
experience, knowledge resources and networks that may provide the entrepreneur with an
19

Unfortunately, the empirical setting of this chapter allows me to test only the brokerage position in the
global network, and as such, the measure may not address correctly the difficulty to transfer the brokerage
advantage. In future versions the network boundaries shall be defined country by country to address this
issue.
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advantage. But because it is also costly to attract investors that are experienced and
reputed (Hsu, 2004), it is relevant to understand under what conditions the experience
and networks of the investors confer a greater advantage to the entrepreneur. Chapters 2
and 3 of this dissertation studied how the impact of investor experience varies across
different financial and regulatory environments. In this section I will focus on how the
network connections of investors may impact firm performance differently depending on
the external environment of the venture.
In particular, the positive effects of reputation endorsements may be lower in
environments with higher expropriation hazards. Previous literature has argued that when
reputed investors invest in an entrepreneurial venture, they reduce the information
asymmetries to third parties; this is the reputation endorsement or certification effect
(Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). This reduction in uncertainty is less
valuable when there are other sources of uncertainty that are more complex to resolve.
Previous research has shown that political and regulatory hazards is one source of
uncertainty for the investors that generally reduces the value of intangible resources,
unless the investor has specific knowledge and connection to overcome it (Delios &
Henisz, 2003). In an environment with a higher risk of political or regulatory
expropriation, the endorsement of an investor with high social status may be less
effective than in more stable environments, because this alone is generally not sufficient
to thrive in that environment. Hence, I expect the effect to be attenuated in these cases.
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Hypothesis 4-4: The effect of investors’ global reputation on the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the hazard of expropriation
increases.
Are Pipes and Prisms so relevant for Innovative Outcomes?
As discussed in chapter 3, experienced investors may enhance the innovative
outcomes of entrepreneurial firms by increasing the general efficiency of the firm, and
hence allowing the managers to devote more attention to the innovative processes, and
also by aiding the firm in focusing its technological trajectories. As a closing question for
this dissertation, one could ask whether the social status or the brokerage of the investor
may also improve the innovative processes of a firm, above and beyond the effect of
experience. However, it probably doesn’t, especially because it is being considered is the
network relationships with other investors. A different question for future research would
be whether the relationships of the investor to other innovative entities, such as portfolio
firms, or strategic investors, could have an effect on the rate of innovation within the
focal firm. Since the investor could take advantage of this network to foster research and
commercialization alliances, it would be more plausible to observe an effect.
Nonetheless, regarding the co-investment network analyzed in this dissertation, I cannot
hypothesize any effects of the network variables.
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Methodology
The Syndication Network
This chapter extends the previous two chapters by introducing the measures of the
network position of the investors. I define the network of co-investment decisions (i.e.
syndication) among venture capital firms, hence excluding other investors such as
corporate venture capital firms, financial institutions, or government-sponsored firms
from the network. By focusing on a single type of investor (or node) the co-investment
relationship (or tie) is more homogeneous in the type of information or resources
exchanged. Previous literature has found that syndication decisions among venture
capital firms add value to the portfolio firm (Brander et al., 2002), or that provide
information and contacts to the venture capital firms in the exchange that facilitate their
geographical expansion (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).
In order to build the network, I gathered all the investment information from
VentureXpert (Thompson Financial) between 1967 and 2005, for investments in any
industry and located in any country (~250,000 investments). With the help of several
research assistants, I cleaned the database to match investment and investor information,
and identified the venture capital firms in the network. Those venture capital firms with
subsidiaries were considered as one sole investor. Following previous literature on
dynamic networks, I defined an investment relationship (or tie) between two firms if they
had co-invested in the same round of investment in the past 3 years (Guler & Guillen,
2010a). Overall, there are 116,453 investments between 1987 and 2004. I constructed two
different dynamic networks. The first one includes all the investments regardless of the
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industry, and the second includes only those investments in a biotechnology firm. Table
2-1 shows the number of venture capital firms in each of the two networks across time.
Table 4-1. Syndication Networks, Nodes and Ties.

1987-1989
1988-1990
1989-1991
1990-1992
1991-1993
1992-1994
1993-1995
1994-1996
1995-1997
1996-1998
1997-1999
1998-2000
1999-2001
2000-2002
2001-2003
2002-2004

All investments
# nodes
# ties
494
3,182
515
3,029
515
2,727
521
2,593
510
2,601
545
2,851
648
3,383
796
4,614
970
5,790
1,192
7,300
1,538
9,370
2,000 13,618
2,125 14,480
2,166 13,792
1,986 10,723
1,878
9,693

Biotech investments
# nodes
# ties
174
198
165
182
146
176
159
184
166
213
180
227
179
246
193
263
237
312
295
402
332
430
430
578
492
688
521
753
519
718
529
709

# Nodes: venture capital firms with investments.
# Ties: rounds of investment with at least one
venture capital firm.

Following the established literature, I measured social status using Bonacich’s
(1987) eigenvector centrality measure. This measure is preferred in the literature to other
centrality scores because it takes into account how central are the actors the focal actor
connects to (Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 1993, 1994). The formula for the centrality of
investor i in time t is as follows:
ci,t =αt � Aij,t cj,t
j

where 𝛼𝑡 is the reciprocal of an eigenvalue, A is the adjacency matrix in time t, with Aij

indicates when investors i and j have a tie at time t, and cjt is the centrality of investor j.
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This measure is zero for a firm with no ties to any other firm, and it increases with the
centrality of the focal firm. I computed this measure both for the network of all
investments and the network of biotech investments; throughout the paper I present the
results of the measure for the network of all investments, since social status tends to be
more transferable (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). The results were robust to using just biotech.
The brokerage advantage is measured using Burt’s (1992) reverse-signed index of
constraint, which in this context measures the extent to which a focal investor syndicates
with investors who syndicate as well with partners of the focal investor. The formula is as
follows:
2

𝐵𝑖𝑡 = − � �𝑝𝑖𝑗 � 𝑝𝑖𝑞 𝑝𝑞𝑗 �
𝑗

𝑞

where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the proportion if i’s network that relate to j, 𝑝𝑖𝑞 is the proportion of i’s

network that relates to q, and 𝑝𝑞𝑗 the proportion of q’s network that relates to j, with i ≠ j

≠ q. Hence, the measure varies from -1, for nodes that are completely constrained, to 0
for nodes that are no constrained; I assigned a value of 0 to those nodes that were

isolated, following previous literature (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). Because the brokerage
advantage refers to the possibility of controlling the information, or the contacts, it may
be more relevant to calculate it for the network of biotech investments. Both network
measures were computed using UCINET (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1999).
Network and Experience Measures
I match the venture capital firms in my sample with the investors in the
syndication network to calculate the measures used in the analyses. For each
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biotechnology firm and each year, I calculate the average of the centrality and the
brokerage of the investors that are part of the syndicate at that time. These are the
InvestorCentralityit and InvestorBrokerageit measures used in the analyses.
Like in the two previous chapters, the experience of venture capital firms is
measured as the total number of IPOs that venture capital firms have been involved in
since founding up to that year. Besides this Experienceit variable, or here on
Experience(IPOs)it, I calculate the Experience(Deals)it variable, which replicates the
former but considers the total number of investments instead of only those that had an
IPO. Using both variables allows me to compare the results in this chapter to those of
previous literature.

Results
Table 4-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the analysis of the investors’
network position on the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition. Note that since relationships
are costly, the networks of investors do not tend to be dense; the average centrality of the
investors included in my sample is 0.02, being 0 an investor that has never syndicated its
investments, and 1 an investor that syndicates all its investments with investors that are
also very active in syndication. While this number may seem low, it is similar to other
studies (Guler & Guillen, 2010a; Hochberg et al., 2007). Regarding the brokerage
position, on average investors scored -0.14 on the reverse signed constraint index, with a
maximum of 0 for those investors that have all redundant ties to other investors, and a
minimum of -1.13, for those investors that have a less constrained position that allows
them to broker information.
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Table 4-2. Descriptive Statistics
mean
s.d.
min
max
11.60 37.23
0
366
1. Experience(IPOs)i,t-1
Experience(Deals)
175.00
466.98
0
4,129
2.
i,t-1
0.02
0.12
0
1
3. InvestorCentrality i,t-1
-0.14
0.26 -1.13
0
4. InvestorBrokerage i,t-1
6.60 21.80
0
219
5. Experience(IPOs) i,t-1 *Expropriation i,t-1
0.01
0.07
0
0.67
6. InvestorCentralityi,t-1 *Expropriation i,t-1
0.99
1.12
0
10
7. Round i,t-1
0.47
0.50
0
1
8. VC i,t-1
1.61
2.34
0
20
9. SizeOfSyndicate i,t-1
0.21
0.40
0
1
10. FinancialInstitution i,t-1
0.03
0.17
0
1
11. CVC i,t-1
5.94 11.09
0
129
12. VC Age i,t-1
0.54
0.08
0.29
1
13. Expropriation i,t-1
1.11
0.69
0.11
3.80
14. Turnover i,t-1
28.80
7.17
1.20
44.9
15. GDP i,t-1
8.79
5.19
0.36
31.7
16. StockMarketCap i,t-1
1.44
3.32
0
40
17. Patents i,t-1
Publications
0.32
1.63
0
30.9
18.
i,t-1
0.36
0.48
0
1
19. BioPharma i
1997
3.07
1990
2003
20. YearOfFounding i
0.23
0.42
0
1
21. Spin-off i
Data from all countries; not weighted (common statistical packages do not allow
weights with longitudinal data); n = 3,359 venture-years.

The Table 4-3 shows that there is no correlation between InvestorCentrality and
InvestorBrokerage, 20 and a very low correlation between these measures and the IPO
experience of the venture capital firms (Experience(IPO)), hence increasing the
confidence that these three measures are capturing different constructs. It is also worth
noting that the correlation between InvestorCentrality and the experience as measured by
the number of deals (Experience(Deals)) is 0.34. Overall these correlations may suggest
that the successful experience, as measured by the number of IPOs, has a higher

20

Note that InvestorCentrality was measured for the whole network and InvestorBrokerage only for the
biotech network. The correlation is still zero when comparing the centrality and brokerage within the global
network; the correlation is -0.05 and significant at 5% when considering the two measures within the
biotechnology network.
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discriminant validity respect to the centrality score than does the experience measured as
the number of deals.
From the correlations table is also apparent that there is clear multicollinearity
between the main effects of Experience and Centrality and the interactions with the
Expropriation Hazard measures. In robustness analyses I centered the variables,
obtaining similar qualitative results as described below.
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Table 4-3. Correlations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Experience(IPOs)i,t-1
Experience(Deals) i,t-1
InvestorCentrality i,t-1
InvestorBrokerage i,t-1
Experience(IPOs) i,t-1
*Expropriation i,t-1
InvestorCentrality i,t-1
*Expropriation i,t-1
Round i,t-1
VC i,t-1
SizeOfSyndicate i,t-1
FinancialInstitution i,t-1
CVC i,t-1
VC Age i,t-1
Expropriation i,t-1
Turnover i,t-1
GDP i,t-1
StockMarketCap i,t-1
Patents i,t-1
Publications i,t-1
BioPharma i
YearOfFounding i
Spin-off i

1

2

3

4

.89
.06
-.05

.34
-.09

-.02

.99

.88

.06

-.05

.06
.52
.33
.56
.16
.11
.30
.10
.03
.19
.14
.28
.11
.09
-.07
.07
11

.33
.57
.40
.66
.22
.14
.48
.10
.02
.18
.09
.30
.16
.11
-.06
.06
12

.99
.14
.22
.17
.03
.04
.60
.08
-.03
.05
.02
.05
.13
.01
-.03
.03
13

-.02
-.31
-.56
-.32
-.12
-.06
-.29
-.02
-.11
-.05
.05
-.08
-.18
-.05
-.05
.03
14

5

.06
.51
.32
.54
.14
.09
.30
.14
.03
.19
.15
.27
.11
.09
-.07
.06
15

6

7

8

.14
.22
.16
.03
.04
.59
.09
-.03
.05
.02
.06
.14
.00
-.03
.05
16

.62
.76
.40
.18
.41
.11
.12
.23
.10
.37
.15
.13
-.05
.05
17

.58
.21
.15
.57
.05
.09
.20
.04
.22
.15
.13
.02
.04
18

9

.55
.29
.40
.03
.04
.19
.06
.36
.15
.15
-.02
.07
19

10

.13
.12
-.04
.00
.07
-.02
.17
.07
.10
.06
.05
20

11. CVC i,t-1
.07
12. VC Age i,t-1
-.06 .11
13. Expropriation i,t-1
-.03 .02 .27
14. Turnover i,t-1
.07 .14 .01 -.16
15. GDP i,t-1
.10 .06 .13 -.20 .37
16. StockMarketCap i,t-1
.11 .15 .03 -.04 .15 .13
17. Patents i,t-1
.02 .21 .05 -.04 .00 .01 .18
18. Publications i,t-1
.04 .06 .03 -.08 .16 .05 .07 .04
19. BioPharma i
-.01 -.02 -.06 .14 .11 .04 -.20 -.07 .09
20. YearOfFounding i
.08 .08 .09 -.11 .10 .21 .13 .09 .14 .06
21. Spin-off i
Data from all countries; not weighted (common statistical packages do not allow weights with
longitudinal data); all correlations larger than 0.03 are significant at p < 0.05; n = 3,359
venture-years.
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Following the same methodology as in chapter 2, I estimate the probability of a
matching between a venture and a syndicate using a probit model. I included the same
measures and the same instrument, i.e. Country Pairs Fixed Effects (see chapter 2 for
details on the identification strategy), and added the measures of the network position of
the investor (InvestorCentrality and InvestorBrokerage). In addition, I included the
interaction between InvestorCentrality and Expropriation to account for the possibility
that investors with a higher social status may be choosing to invest in countries with a
lower Expropriation Hazard.
The results, reported in Table 4-4, show that having investors that are more
central in the network and those with a greater brokerage position increase the chances of
a matching. This may indicate that those investors with social capital are able to attract
more capital and venture capital firms in successive rounds. However, investors that are
more central prefer firms in environments with less Expropriation Hazard. This suggests
that they have fewer incentives to utilize this social capital when they may lose more. It is
also worth noting that the network position of the venture capital firms explains most of
the variation from the presence of a VC, and some of the coefficients change.
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Table 4-4. Results of the Probit Analysis on the Probability of Matching
(Selection)a

Matching
VCi,t
-0.39*** (0.05)
VCi,t*VCi,t-1
0.41*** (0.10)
b
VCi,t*Experience(IPOs)i,t-1
0.00
(0.00)
Syndicate controls
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b
-0.01
(0.01)
VCi,t-1
0.12
(0.11)
InvestorCentrality i,t-1
6.06*** (1.59)
InvestorBrokerage i,t-1
0.19*
(0.08)
InvestorCentrality i,t-1
*Expropriation i,t-1
-9.31*** (2.69)
Round1i,t-1
-0.35*** (0.05)
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
0.20*** (0.02)
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
-0.00
(0.05)
CVC i,t-1
0.24
(0.17)
VC Age i,t-1
0.01*
(0.00)
Venture’s country controls
Expropriationi,t-1
0.67
(0.42)
Turnover i,t-1
0.16*** (0.04)
GDP i,t-1
-0.03*** (0.01)
StockMarketCapi,t-1 b
-0.02*
(0.01)
Venture’s controls
Patentsi,t-1
0.01
(0.01)
Publicationsi,t-1 b
-0.00
(0.01)
BioPharmai
-0.02
(0.05)
YearOfFoundingi
-0.02*
(0.01)
Spin-offi
-0.12†
(0.07)
Constant
43.70
(17.69)
Country Pairs Fixed Effects
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
a
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 185,751 (all
possible matches between active syndicates and ventures).
b
Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly
transformed (divided by 10); for interpretation, divide the
coefficient by 10.
† p < 0.10
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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Table 4-5 shows the results of the Cox regression model on the hazard of
occurrence of an IPO or an acquisition. The baseline model (model 1) includes the
controls and the Experience(IPOs) model, replicating the results found in chapter 2, while
adding VC age as an additional control and including the Inverse Mill’s Ratio from the
first stage which, in contrast to chapter 2, controls for the network position of the
investor. The results are robust to these changes, though the coefficient for
Experience(IPO) loses some statistical significance.
The next three models incorporate the InvestorCentrality measure (model 2), the
InvestorBrokerage measure (model 3), and both measures simultaneously (model 4).
Overall, none of the two measures are statistically different from zero; however, the
Experience(IPOs) measure is robust to including these measures and significant at a 5%
confidence level. Altogether, these results suggest that a greater experience of the venture
capital firms increases the chances of the venture going public or being acquired, even
after controlling for the social capital of the investors. Therefore, these results support the
hypothesis 4-1, which stated that the effect of investor experience is not solely driven by
the reputation of the investor, but there is also a know-how effect. However, these results
do not support hypotheses 4-2 and 4-3, which predicted that investors with a more central
position and with a greater brokerage position would increase the hazard of a liquidity
event.
Guler and Guillen (2010a) show that while the social status conferred by being
central in the network of investments is transferable across borders, this is not the case
with the brokerage position, which is more country specific. Since the measure for
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brokerage used here is calculated within the global network, I could not capture the
nuances of which group of investors a particular venture capital is connected to; this may
explain the lack of significance of this variable. A richer measure that accounts for the
geography of the network may be needed to find effects.
Overall, these results contrast with the findings of Hochberg et al (2007), who
find that InvestorCentrality has a positive and significant effect on firm performance,
while Experience has a positive but more moderate effect on firm performance. One of
the reasons why these results differ may lie in the prediction that the effect of Experience
and InvestorCentrality are not homogeneous across different regulatory environments.
Model 5 tests the interaction of both measures with the Expropriation hazards measure,
finding that while the main effect of Experience and InvestorCentrality on the hazard of a
liquidity event is positive and significant, this effect is attenuated when the hazard of
Expropriation is very high, in support of hypotheses 4-4. Hence, since the United States
has a low Expropriation hazard, this may explain the magnitude and significance of the
investor centrality measures in Hochberg et al (2007). These results are robust when only
IPOs are considered (model 6), although some coefficients lose significance, partly due to
a lower power of the analysis (i.e. less percentage of events). 21

21

In unreported regressions I analyzed the full model, including the interactions of the Experience variable
with the Round of Investment and also with the stock market Turnover from the second chapter in the
dissertation. When controlling for these interactions, many of the results lose significance, which may be a
result of the high multicollinearity among them.
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Table 4-5. Results of Cox Regression on the Hazard of an IPO or an Acquisition
Dependent Variablea
Hypotheses
(H4-1) Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b
(H4-2) InvestorCentrality i,t-1
(H4-3) InvestorBrokerage i,t-1
(H4-4) InvestorCentrality i,t-1
*Expropriation i,t-1
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1
*Expropriation i,t-1
Syndicate Controls
VCi,t-1
Roundi,t-1
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
CVC i,t-1
VC Age i,t-1
Country Controls
Expropriationi,t-1
Turnover i,t-1
GDP i,t-1
StockMarketCapi,t-1b
Venture Controls
Patentsi,t-1
Publicationsi,t-1b
BioPharmai
YearOfFoundingi
Spin-offi
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc
Country Fixed Effects

IPO or
M&A
(1)
0.03†

IPO or
M&A
(2)
(0.02)

IPO or
M&A
(3)

0.04*
0.51

(0.02)
(0.77)

0.57*
0.03
0.01
0.42†
0.35
0.00

(0.26)
(0.10)
(0.05)
(0.23)
(0.32)
(0.01)

0.55†
0.02
0.01
0.42†
0.36
0.01

(0.28)
(0.10)
(0.05)
(0.23)
(0.32)
(0.01)

-0.04
0.09
-0.01
0.03†

(1.65)
(0.23)
(0.02)
(0.02)

0.55*
0.02
0.01
0.42†
0.36
0.01

(0.26)
(0.10)
(0.05)
(0.23)
(0.32)
(0.01)

-0.04
0.09
-0.01
0.03†

(1.64)
(0.23)
(0.02)
(0.02)

-0.07
0.09
-0.01
0.03

(1.64)
(0.23)
(0.02)
(0.02)

(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.18)
(0.04)
(0.22)
(0.44)

0.04**
-0.00
0.50**
0.13**
0.12
1.21**
Yes

(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.18)
(0.04)
(0.22)
(0.44)

0.04**
0.00
0.50**
0.13**
0.11
1.21**
Yes

0.03†
-0.00

(0.02)
(0.38)

0.04**
0.00
0.50**
0.13**
0.11
1.21**
Yes

(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.18)
(0.04)
(0.22)
(0.44)

(continues…)
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(…continued)

Dependent Variablea

IPO or
M&A
(4)

IPO or
M&A
(5)

IPO
(6)

Hypotheses
(H4-1) Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b 0.04* (0.02)
0.29**
(0.11)
0.44**
(0.15)
(H4-2) InvestorCentrality i,t-1
0.53
(0.78) 10.79*
(4.91) 11.05+
(6.46)
(H4-3) InvestorBrokerage i,t-1 -0.05
(0.39)
-0.18
(0.39)
0.19
(0.63)
(H4-4) InvestorCentrality i,t-1
*Expropriation i,t-1
-17.50*
(8.61) -17.43
(11.31)
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1
*Expropriation i,t-1
-0.44*
(0.19) -0.68**
(0.26)
Syndicate Controls
VCi,t-1
0.56† (0.29)
0.53†
(0.29)
0.22
(0.45)
Roundi,t-1
0.03
(0.10)
0.05
(0.10) -0.08
(0.14)
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
0.01
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.05)
0.11+
(0.06)
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
0.42† (0.23)
0.36
(0.23)
0.49
(0.34)
CVC i,t-1
0.36
(0.32)
0.27
(0.33) -0.81
(0.58)
VC Age i,t-1
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
Country Controls
Expropriationi,t-1
-0.09
(1.65)
1.87
(1.68)
1.51
(2.12)
Turnover i,t-1
0.09
(0.23)
0.06
(0.22)
0.18
(0.27)
GDP i,t-1
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02) -0.04+
(0.02)
StockMarketCapi,t-1b
0.03
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
Venture Controls
Patentsi,t-1
0.05** (0.02)
0.04**
(0.02)
0.04+
(0.02)
Publicationsi,t-1b
-0.00
(0.04)
0.00
(0.04)
0.01
(0.06)
BioPharmai
0.50** (0.18)
0.48**
(0.18)
0.95***
(0.28)
YearOfFoundingi
0.13** (0.04)
0.13**
(0.04) -0.02
(0.06)
Spin-offi
0.12
(0.22)
0.11
(0.22)
0.48
(0.32)
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc
1.21** (0.44)
1.20**
(0.44)
1.16+
(0.62)
Country Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
a
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 3,359; country fixed effects for United States,
Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Rep. of Korea.
b
Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided by 10); for
interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10.
c
Inverse Mill’s Ratio calculated from the results of the selection equation (stage 1).
† p < 0.10
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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Table 4-6 further compares the results to those of Hochberg et al (2007). Model 8
replicates model 4 but in the subsample of ventures founded in the United States, finding
that the InvestorCentrality is positive and significant, while the Experience(IPOs) is not.
Finally, because their measure of Experience is based on a count of deals in which
investors have participated, and not a count of IPOs, model 7 estimates the effect of
Experience(Deals) instead of Experience(IPOs). Note that this measure has a much lower
coefficient, and it is not significant. Robustness tests were conducted and the effect of
Experience(Deals) was consistently not significantly different from zero. Interestingly,
the correlation of this measure with the centrality of the investor is much higher, which
may indicate there is less discriminant validity. In other words, the experience of the
investors as measured by the number of deals may be a better proxy of the social status or
the size or tenure of the investors than of the know-how and resources that have been
accumulated.
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Table 4-6. Results, Comparison to Hochberg et al (2007)
Dependent Variablea
Sample

IPO or
M&A
Whole
(4)

IPO or
M&A
Whole
(7)

IPO or
M&A
U.S.
(8)

Hypotheses
(H4-1) Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b
0.04* (0.02)
-0.02
(0.04)
b
(H4-1) Experience(Deals) i,t-1
0.00
(0.00)
(H4-2) InvestorCentrality i,t-1
0.51
(0.77) 0.18
(0.78)
14.99†
(7.75)
(H4-3) InvestorBrokerage i,t-1
-0.02
(0.39)
0.49
(1.34)
Syndicate Controls
VCi,t-1
0.57* (0.26) 0.57*
(0.29)
1.59†
(0.91)
Round1i,t-1
0.03
(0.10) 0.03
(0.10)
-0.45†
(0.24)
SizeOfSyndicatei,t-1
0.01
(0.05) 0.01
(0.05)
0.29*
(0.14)
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
0.42† (0.23) 0.40†
(0.23)
0.51
(0.58)
CVC i,t-1
0.35
(0.32) 0.33
(0.32)
0.44
(0.74)
VC Age i,t-1
0.00
(0.01) 0.01
(0.01)
-0.09
(0.07)
Country Controls
Expropriationi,t-1
-0.07
(1.64) -0.07
(1.65)
-87.33
(109.57)
Turnover i,t-1
0.09
(0.23) 0.07
(0.23)
-0.02
(0.71)
GDP i,t-1
-0.01
(0.02) -0.01
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.24)
StockMarketCapi,t-1b
0.03
(0.02) 0.03†
(0.02)
0.02
(0.10)
Venture Controls
Patentsi,t-1
0.04** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
0.06
(0.06)
Publicationsi,t-1b
-0.00
(0.04) 0.00
(0.04)
0.17
(0.17)
BioPharmai
0.50** (0.18) 0.48** (0.18)
0.24
(0.52)
YearOfFoundingi
0.13** (0.04) 0.13** (0.04)
0.20
(0.14)
Spin-offi
0.12
(0.22) 0.13
(0.22)
0.92
(0.66)
Inverse Mill’s Ratioi,tc
1.21** (0.44) 1.17** (0.44)
1.79
(1.15)
Country Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
No
N
3,359
3,359
372
a
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; country fixed effects for United States, Germany,
United Kingdom, France, and Rep. of Korea.
b
Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided by 10); for
interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10.
c
Inverse Mill’s Ratio calculated from the results of the selection equation (stage 1).
† p < 0.10
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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These findings are economically significant, as represented in figures 4-1 and 4-2.
An increase of one standard deviation in the Experience of the syndicate (i.e. 37 IPOs),
leads to a 33% increase in the hazard of an IPO or acquisition if there is a low
Expropriation Hazard (one standard deviation below the mean), and to an increase of
only 6% if the Expropriation Hazard is high (one standard deviation above the mean).
Note that the impact of Experience on the hazard of a liquidity event has reduced
significantly from the levels in figure 2-2, now that InvestorCentrality is accounted for.
Figure 4-1. Effect of Experience by Level of Expropriation Hazard
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Experience(IPO)
This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in
Experience at three levels of Expropriation Hazard: mean, and plus/minus one
standard error, using model 5 in table 4-5. An increase of a standard deviation in the
Experience of the syndicate (that is, 37 additional IPOs), increases the hazard of an
IPO or an acquisition by: a) 33% if Expropriation is one standard deviation below the
mean; b) 19% if Expropriation is at the mean; c) 6% if Expropriation is at the mean
plus one standard deviation.
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The effect of InvestorCentrality depends even more of the levels of Expropriation.
Figure 4-2 shows that for high levels of Expropriation Hazard (one standard deviation
above the mean), the effect is flat and virtually zero. However, when the Expropriation
Hazard is very low, an increase of one standard deviation in InvestorCentrality (that is,
an increase of 0.12), increases the hazard of an IPO or an acquisition by 174%.
Figure 4-2. Effect of Centrality by Level of Expropriation Hazard
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This graph shows the marginal effect on the Hazard Rate of an increase in
InvestorCentrality at three levels of Expropriation Hazard: mean, and plus/minus one
standard error, using model 5 in table 4-5. An increase of a standard deviation in the
InvestorCentrality of the syndicate (that is, an increase of 0.12), increases the hazard
of an IPO or an acquisition by: a) 174% if Expropriation is one standard deviation
below the mean; b) 34% if Expropriation is at the mean; c) and reduces the hazard by
1% if Expropriation is at the mean plus one standard deviation.
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Finally, I test the effect of InvestorCentrality and InvestorBrokerage compared to
the effect of investor Experience(IPOs) on the flow of innovative outcomes. Table 2-6
presents the results of the same estimation procedure used in chapter 3, adding the two
network position variables. Overall, Experience(IPOs) has an effect on the three
outcomes even after controlling for the network measures, while the latter have generally
no effect on the innovative outcomes. Even though the coefficient for InvestorCentrality
is negative and significant on the flow of publications, robustness analyses (unreported)
show that this effect is not consistent throughout models. The results were also robust to
adding the interactions of Experience and Expropriation Hazard. Therefore, these results
suggest that the social status and brokerage of the investors has an impact on the hazard
of a liquidity event but not on the innovative outcomes of the firm, as expected.
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Table 4-7. Results of QMLE Poisson on Innovative Outcomes
Dependent Variablea

Patentsit
(1)

Publicationsit
(2)

Patent Citationsit
(3)

Main variables
Experience(IPOs)i,t-1 b
0.04*
(0.02) 0.04*
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
InvestorCentrality i,t-1
-0.63
(0.74) -0.76*
(0.32) -0.51
(1.51)
InvestorBrokerage i,t-1
-0.03
(0.29) 0.14
(0.26)
0.22
(0.32)
Syndicate Controls
VCi,t-1
0.13
(0.19) 0.05
(0.16)
0.02
(0.25)
Round1i,t-1
-0.12
(0.12) -0.05
(0.10) -0.29*
(0.13)
FinancialInstitutioni, t-1
0.32†
(0.18) 0.03
(0.13)
0.32
(0.24)
CVC i,t-1
0.02
(0.32) -0.22
(0.28) -0.77**
(0.24)
VC Age i,t-1
0.00
(0.01) 0.01*** (0.00)
0.03†
(0.02)
Country Controls
Expropriationi,t-1
0.92
(2.02) 0.25
(1.21)
5.53*
(2.34)
Turnover i,t-1
-0.11
(0.14) 0.37**
(0.13)
0.18
(0.20)
GDP i,t-1
0.04
(0.11) -0.06
(0.08) -0.29*
(0.14)
b
StockMarketCapi,t-1
0.01
(0.02) 0.05*** (0.02)
0.08***
(0.02)
Venture Controls
Patent Stocki,t-1
-0.14*** (0.03) 0.01
(0.03) -0.02
(0.02)
Publication Stocki,t-1b
0.00
(0.16) -0.22*** (0.04)
0.24
(0.17)
Patent Stocki,t-1
* Publication Stocki,t-1b
0.01*** (0.00) -0.00
(0.00) -0.00
(0.00)
Patent Citation Stocki,t-1
-0.01
(0.01) 0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Agei,t
0.57*** (0.10) 0.75*** (0.10)
1.19***
(0.17)
Agei,t2
-0.04*** (0.01) -0.04*** (0.01) -0.05***
(0.01)
Firm Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Venture-years
1,134
1,266
706
Ventures
248
299
145
a
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; regression estimated with the –xtqmlp- procedure in
Stata.
b
Experience, Publications, and StockMarketCap are linearly transformed (divided by 10); for
interpretation, divide the coefficient by 10.
† p < 0.10
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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Discussion and Conclusions
Building on the previous two chapters, I analyzed the extent to which the effect of
investor experience on entrepreneurial firms derives from adding value to the firm or
from a certification effect. Using the same empirical setting and analyses, I study the
effect of the social status of the investor and the remaining effect of investor experience
as proxies for the two mechanisms, finding both effects. In particular, the effect of
investor experience remains significant after controlling for the social status and
brokerage of the investor, which indicates that the knowledge resources of the investors
are relevant. The social status of the investors, however, facilitates the process of a firm
going public or being acquired, but does not affect directly the innovative outcomes of
the firm.
Consistent with previous literature, when investors of high social status endorse a
new venture, there is a reputation transfer that enhances the chances of this venture going
public or being acquired. This reputation endorsement effect, however, does not affect
directly the innovative outcomes of firms. Another implication of these findings is that
investors experience has a direct effect on performance after controlling for the reputation
effect; but also an indirect effect through its impact on the innovative processes.
The results of this paper further complement those of Hochberg et al (2007) by
analyzing how both effects change across different institutional environments. Consistent
with their findings, both the reputation of the investors and their knowhow enhance firm
performance. However, I found that these effects change across institutional
environments at different rates. Therefore, future research should examine these issues in
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cross-national and longitudinal empirical settings to gain a better understanding of the
dynamics of both processes.
One caveat of this study is that it seeks to separate the effects of social status and
knowhow, while these effects are intrinsically related. In fact, they share a common
antecedent: experience. As investors engage in investments, they build a network of
contacts that provides them reputation, but they also learn from that experience, build
capabilities, and acquire know-how. This intrinsic correlation among the two concepts is
difficult to sort out empirically. I have followed past research and compared the effects of
network position and the remaining effect of experience. However, it is necessary to
exercise caution in the interpretation of the results. A firm that attracts a great manager
takes advantage of its know-how to identify talent, a network of contacts to reach her,
and a reputation to attract her.
In future research I seek to extend this study by comparing the position of the
investors in the global network with the position in the individual country networks. The
findings by Guler and Guillen (2010a) suggest that there is value in comparing the
networks in different countries, since some of the characteristics of the network position
cannot be transferred. Besides syndication networks, future research could also
investigate the consequences of the network position of investors in different networks,
such as the portfolio firms network or connections to other firms in the industry.
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5. Conclusions
This dissertation has sought to answer the questions of how and where investors
add value to the entrepreneurial firms they invest in. I have shown that experienced
investors may knowledge and networks of contacts that are valuable to firms, but this
value is contingent on the external environment. Controlling for the matching of investors
and firms, I found that experienced investors have an effect on the likelihood that a
startup will go public or will be acquired, and also on the innovative outcomes of firms.
While part of this effect is due to the network of contacts of the investors, there is an
additional effect of experience which suggests the knowhow of the investor is also
relevant. Jointly, these results suggest that the effect of investor experience on the
performance of firms adds value beyond a transfer of reputation.
However, this effect is contingent on the environment of the firm. This
dissertation contributes to the past literature by analyzing how experienced investors add
value to portfolio firms differently under different institutional environments. In
particular, in uncertain environments entrepreneurial firms depend more on external
resources, and experienced investors have a greater effect on firm performance. This
finding is consistent with resource-dependence theory. For entrepreneurs it is difficult to
access the resources investors offer, such as network of contacts or managerial
capabilities; yet, these resources are very important for them, especially when there is
more uncertainty in the environment. The finding that the effect of experience varies with
the environment supports the thesis that the optimal strategy is not independent from the
environment. A summary of the hypotheses can be found on table 5-1.
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Table 5-1. Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis

Support

2-1

Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired.

Yes

2-2

The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of
the venture going public or being acquired is greater during
the first round of investment than in subsequent rounds.

No

2-3

The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of
the venture going public or being acquired decreases as the
liquidity of the local stock market increases.

Yes

2-4

The effect of investors’ past IPO experience on the chances of
the venture going public or being acquired decreases as the
hazard of expropriation increases.

Yes

3-1

The number of innovative outcomes of a firm increases with
the experience of the venture capital firms in the investment
syndicate.

Yes

3-2

The effect of the experience of the venture capital firms on the
innovative outcomes of a firm is greater when the firm faces
increased political and regulatory hazard.

Yes

4-1

Investors’ past IPO experience increases the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired, even after controlling
for the network of relationships.

Yes

4-2

Investors’ global reputation increases the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired.

No

4-3

Investors’ brokerage position in the venture’s country
increases the chances of the venture going public or being
acquired.

No

4-4

The effect of investors’ global reputation on the chances of the
venture going public or being acquired decreases as the hazard
of expropriation increases.

Yes

Even though this dissertation has shown that the effect of investors on startups
vary across institutional environments, it has also posed further questions regarding the
processes. In particular, when comparing the results of the first two essays there is an
apparent contradiction: experienced investors have more effect on the likelihood of a firm
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going public or being acquired when the expropriation hazard is low, but more effect on
innovative outcomes when the expropriation hazard is high. To reconcile these results
one would need more information on what experience and expropriation hazard really
represent. In general, firms perform worse if there is an expropriation hazard, unless they
have the experiential learning to deal with the political risk in a country (Delios &
Henisz, 2003). Hence, while an investor may be very experienced in past deals, we
should ask whether this experience was suited to learn how to operate in a country with
higher political risk. In other words, it is necessary to distinguish between experience in
countries with high political risk and experience in countries with lower political risk.
Likewise, one could argue that political risk has very different implications for the
process of going public or being acquired, and for the innovative processes. For instance,
the former is an event in a point in time in which it is critical to manage the stakeholders.
The latter, however, extends during a long period of time; and may be more affected by
big regulatory changes regarding intellectual property rights or, in the case of
biotechnology firms, what areas of research are allowed. In these cases, a good
understanding of the regulations and not necessarily managing the actors may suffice. In
sum, to reconcile these results the nuances of these two variables should be explored.
This dissertation contributes to resource-dependence theory by providing an
empirical test of how the effect of external resources varies with the uncertainty in the
environment. Resources of investors such as managerial capabilities, or human resources
knowhow, or contacts, are common to many organizations and therefore they would not
qualify as “controlled.” However, they can be defined as controlled from the perspective
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of an entrepreneurial firm that has limited ways to access them. Hence, by considering a
more firm-specific definition of what controlled resources are, it is possible to extend the
empirical application of resource-dependence theory. Resource-dependence theorists may
benefit from a more firm-specific definition of what is a controlled external resource,
allowing the theory to be applied to a wider set of situations. This dissertation provides
one example of this empirical testing.
This dissertation also speaks to the relational view of the firm, which posits that
relational rents can be generated if there are relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing
routines, complementary resources or capabilities, or effective governance (Dyer &
Singh, 1998). Hence, while investors and entrepreneurial firms may benefit from their
partnership this requires establishing knowledge-sharing routines, investing in specific
assets, or setting an adequate governance (De Clercq & Sapienza, 2001). Since the
benefits are not automatic, the experience of investors in alliances is critical to enhancing
the performance of the firms they invest. When the environment of the entrepreneurial
firm is more uncertain, there is a greater advantage in the relational rents that can be
obtained from the partnership. The resource-dependence theory and the relational view of
the firm are, hence, complementary. While the former explains the situations under which
a firm may benefit from the environment, the latter explains how this potential value may
be realized.
Entrepreneurship scholars have sought to understand to what extent the investors
association to firm performance is due to the matching of investors and firms and to what
extent they add value to the firm. Research evidence seems to suggest that both effects
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coexist (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Sørensen, 2007). My dissertation adds to this stream
of literature by testing both effects in a cross-national framework, finding evidence of
both effects using different methodologies and on different dependent variables, adding
further support to the hypothesis that investors add value beyond the selection of
investments.
Another question in the entrepreneurship literature is whether this effect of
investors on performance is a pure endorsement or signaling effect or whether there is
some influence on the strategy and bundle of resources of entrepreneurial firms. That is,
whether investors certify and/or add value. While past research has found that both
effects coexist, most studies have considered them separately. One exception is Hochberg
et al’s (2007) research, which using a sample of U.S. venture capital investments found
evidence of both effects. This dissertation adds to this research stream by testing both
effects in an international setting. My results confirm the finding by Hochberg et al
(2007) and, in addition, show that both the effect of investor experience and investor
network position are contingent on the characteristics of the institutional environment. As
a consequence, further research should approach this question in a longitudinal and crossnational setting to fully understand the dynamics of both effects.
In addition, by studying the effect of investor experience and investor network
position on two different outcomes, this dissertation sheds light on the processes by
which investors add value to a firm. I found that while the contacts of investors enhance
the chances that the firm will go public or will be acquired, it does not directly affect the
innovative outcomes of the firm. However, the experience of investor has an effect on
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both outcomes, and so it is plausible that fostering the innovation of a firm is one indirect
mechanism by which investors’ knowhow impacts firm financial performance.
Finally, this dissertation has sought to contribute to the international business
literature by analyzing how these effects vary across different countries and institutional
environments. Past research has shown that the strategies of venture capital firms change
depending on the environment. The decision to enter a country depends both on the
network position of the investor in their home country (Guler & Guillen, 2010a) and on
the institutions in the country of destination (Guler & Guillen, 2010b). The strategy of
investors may also differ across countries, because the risk of the ventures that are backed
by venture capital firms is similar across countries, hence suggesting that investors are
more careful in the selection of investments in countries where there is ex ante a higher
risk (Guler & McGahan, 2006). My dissertation extends the growing international
entrepreneurship literature by showing that the institutional environment moderates the
extent to which investors and firms may generate relational rents in their partnership. In
other words, there is not an optimal strategy for managing the partnership relationship.
This dissertation is not without limitations. I have analyzed a single industry in
order to control more the variation in the data. However, single industry studies pose
more concerns to the generalizability of the results. One of the peculiarities of the biotech
industry is that startups require more time to be profitable; therefore, this increases the
information asymmetries of investors when selecting their investments. To the extent that
the selection stage is controlled for, some of these concerns may be lessened. Besides,
because biotechnology startups tend to be located in countries with a moderate to high
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intellectual property protection, there is a restriction in range for some of the institutional
variables. While this makes the tests more conservative, there is a concern about the
generalizability of the results outside the observed range. Finally, while the data in this
dissertation spans a large variety of firms and countries, it lacks the richness of smaller
sample studies. Hence, there is less evidence about the actual processes by which the
experience of investors impacts firm performance.
The results of this dissertation pose questions for future research. In particular, the
effect of investor experience should be further unpacked. Not all experience is the same,
and it does not have the same value for different processes, as evidenced from the
different directionality of the results on innovation and financial performance. One of the
dimensions that should be considered is whether investors have specialized on early stage
investments or in later stage investments. While the former may be more relevant to
identify which products have a better commercialization potential and, hence, help the
firm focus and foster its innovative outcomes, the latter may be more useful to facilitate
the IPO or acquisition process. Whether the investor has experience in environments with
a more turbulent political or regulatory environment may also be relevant to better
understand the interplay of these two variables.
Even though the theoretical predictions were tested in the setting of venture
capital firms, I believe many of them could be extended to other investor types. In
particular, investors that are generally involved in the management of the firm have the
potential to enhance (or decrease) the performance of the firms they invest in. Future
research could analyze the different goals and interests of investors to compare whether
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the effects are similar or different to those of venture capital firms. Moreover, some of
these hypotheses could be extended to investors in firms that are established. Stakeholder
theorists have analyzed how institutional investors contribute to the performance of firms
(David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001). An analysis of how their experience and connections
may be external resources to organizations may improve our understanding of the
phenomenon of investor activism.
The findings of this dissertation have implications for entrepreneurs as well as for
investors. When evaluating financing options, entrepreneurs face a choice among
investors with a variety of experience, investors that also offer different monetary
contributions. While past research has shown that entrepreneurs are willing to forego
valuation to attract more reputed investors to their firms (Hsu, 2004), entrepreneurs
should understand when such reputation will translate into higher performance. In other
words, depending on the uncertainty derived from the financial markets or regulatory
institutions, the entrepreneur may be better off by attracting a reputed investor or not.
Investors face a different dilemma. With limited attention, they have to decide how to
allocate the time of their human resources to the firms in the portfolio (Gifford, 1997).
Knowing when their expertise and network of contacts have a greater impact on
performance may be useful in determining the optimal allocation of their resources.
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